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Abstract
The need for computer systems to be reliable has increasingly become important
as the dependence on their accurate functioning by users increases. The failure
of these systems could very costly in terms of time and money. In as much as
system’s designers try to design fault-free systems, it is practically impossible
to have such systems as different factors could affect them. In order to achieve
system’s reliability, fault tolerance methods are usually deployed; these methods
help the system to produce acceptable results even in the presence of faults.
Root cause analysis, a dependability method for which the causes of failures are
diagnosed for the purpose of correction or prevention of future occurrence is less
efficient. It is reactive and would not prevent the first failure from occurring. For
this reason, methods with predictive capabilities are preferred; failure prediction
methods are employed to predict the potential failures to enable preventive
measures to be applied.
Most of the predictive methods have been supervised, requiring accurate
knowledge of the system’s failures, errors and faults. However, with changing
system components and system updates, supervised methods are ineffective.
Error detection methods allows error patterns to be detected early to enable
preventive methods to be applied. Performing this detection in an unsupervised
way could be more effective as changes to systems or updates would less affect
such a solution. In this thesis, we introduced an unsupervised approach to
detecting error patterns in a system using its data. More specifically, the thesis
investigates the use of both event logs and resource utilization data to detect
error patterns. It addresses both the spatial and temporal aspects of achieving
system dependability. The proposed unsupervised error detection method has
been applied on real data from two different production systems. The results
are positive; showing average detection F-measure of about 75%.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Since the inception of modern computers, the performance growth has been
steady and tremendous. With ever-increasing society’s challenges, applications
needing higher computational capabilities increase. This computational need
led to the emergence of supercomputers in the 20th century. Since then, the
performance of these systems have been improved to meet the growing need,
leading to the era of petascale computing whereby, as at 2015, the fastest su-
percomputer can achieve a performance of 33×1015 for floating point operation
per second (FLOPS)1.
With the future exascale systems projected to have a performance of up to
1 × 1018 FLOPS, the need for these systems to remain fault tolerant becomes
increasingly important [43, 76]. This is because people, key sectors or organisa-
tions are becoming more dependent on these systems. This is further buttressed
by the increasing reliance on these systems by most computationally demanding
applications such as used in financial systems, weather forecasting, control sys-
tems etc. The increased demand for these systems has led to continued growth
in their capabilities to meet up; this has also led to their increased size and
complexities.
1.1 Motivation
Attaining and maintaining a system’s dependability becomes a challenge as
these computing systems are not immune to failure, more so, the increasing
complexity makes them difficult to manage. The failure of these systems can
be costly both in terms of the time and money. This is because it takes a long
1http://www.top500.org/lists/2015/06/; (accessed September, 2015)
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time for system administrators to identify and fix the problems. For example,
the failure of applications involved in high speed financial trading can be huge.
Large-scale systems generate huge volume of “log events“ or system state
data. These log events which are sometimes referred to as the health information
of the system, are basically the first point of contact whenever there is a failure
of the system. However, there is basically no way to know that these systems
have encountered faults and could eventually fail by merely observing these
system state data or event logs. This is because they are massive and doing so
can be overwhelming. Additionally, only few of the events are symptomatic of
faults and/or failure [103], that is, a large percentage is redundant. Fortunately,
the events could form patterns that characterises failure. In other words, these
event patterns preceding a particular failure are the symptoms of such failure.
Root cause analysis methods [118], [23] have been used to find causes of failures
from the event logs, however, these methods can only help find the root causes
of failure, but cannot prevent it.
In order to make these systems dependable, failure runs must be detected as
early as possible to enable taking other proactive failure handling methods or
approaches and avoid its consequences. If symptoms of failures can be detected
early, failure preventive, avoidance or mitigation measures can be applied. This
thesis focuses on detection of error patterns using unsupervised learning ap-
proach in large-scale HPC systems.The logs generated by the systems at run
time are often indicative of errors; these errors could eventually result in failure
if not properly handled by system administrators.
1.2 Background
The concept of dependability and fault tolerance is explained in this section.
We explain some basic terminologies relating to the concept of dependability in
order to explain the challenge and draw home our approach.
2
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1.2.1 Faults, Errors and Failure
A system generally is made up of interacting components. These components
and/or systems are expected to display high level of dependability by delivering
the expected service. However, they are usually not immune to faults and these
faults are evident by the errors the system produced which could eventually
lead to failure. These are termed as threats to dependability [6].
A failure, according to Avizienis et al. [6] “is an event that occurs when the
delivered service deviates from correct service”. That is, a failure occurs when
a system transits from correct behaviour to an incorrect implementation of
system’s function. The anomalous system’s service may assume different levels
of seriousness. An error on the other hand, is a deviation from the correct
state given that failure involves one or more system states deviating from the
correct state [6]. It is important to note that not all errors would eventually
lead to failure. An error is detected by the presence of a logged error messages
by the system. A fault is the cause of an error. In other words, an error is a
manifestation of a system’s fault. When a fault causes an error, it is said to
be in an active state otherwise, it is dormant or undetected. Hence, faults are
the root causes of failures. Since systems are composed of components, a failure
at the subcomponent level becomes a fault for the component. The concept of
faults, errors, failures and their relationships is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: An illustration of the relationship between faults, errors and failures
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1.2.2 Dependability
It is expected for systems to be dependable, that is, possessing the ability to
avoid service failures that typically occur more frequently with an unacceptable
severity level, according to Avizienis et al. [6]. In general, dependability is “a
property of a computing system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed
on the service it delivers”. A system’s dependability ensures that it is ready
to deliver correct service (availability). Such a system must be reliable, that is,
the service offered must be correct. Other attributes of a dependable systems
include integrity, whereby a system is devoid of unacceptable alterations, main-
tainability, whereby the system can be modified or updated or repaired; and
safety to ensure no fatal outcomes on users or the system itself.
The dependability schema showing the attributes, threats and means for
which dependability of a system can be achieved is seen in Figure 1.2.
The means for which dependability is achieved is as depicted in the schema.
These means include:
• Fault prevention which involves preventing fault from occurring, especially
development faults.
• Fault Tolerance involves avoiding failures in the presence of faults. This
is achieve by error detection and system recovery. The work of this thesis
is focused on this part.
• Fault Removal involves diagnosis and applying preventive and corrective
maintenance.
• Fault Forecasting estimates current and future incidences and their con-
sequences.
1.2.3 Fault Tolerance
Fault Tolerant computing dates back to the early days of computing [140], where
designs are made to withstand hardware faults. As this field emerges, both
4
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Figure 1.2: Dependability tree diagram
software and hardware fault tolerance became a focus. In distributed systems,
it is expected that part of the system may be failing while the remaining part
continues to function and outwardly normal. Fault tolerance in distributed
systems is aimed at having systems that can automatically recover when part of
the system is affected by a failure. The overall performance of the system is also
not expected to be affected. In other words, the system is expected to continue
its normal operation at an acceptable level even in the presence of failure.
Fault tolerance approaches are aimed at failure avoidance [4, 5]. The pro-
cesses involved in achieving this are error detection and system recovery. For
clarity, we show the techniques involves in a schema diagram shown in Figure 1.3.
Error handling techniques are aimed at eliminating errors from the system’s
state. Such methods include rollback recovery techniques (e.g. checkpointing)
and rollforward techniques (where system’s state without errors is used as new
state). Fault handling techniques are targeted at preventing future occurrence
of failure. Root cause analysis techniques belong to this category.
Error detection methods identify the presence of an error in a system. These
methods are implemented to detect errors either during the system’s normal
5
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Figure 1.3: Fault Tolerance techniques
operation or when it is suspended. Usually, error detection is performed first
before rollback recovery or rollforward techniques are invoked for any recovery
process.
As explained earlier, faults are manifested through errors and these errors
are logged by systems as error logs. The errors are pointers to eventual failures,
hence, these error events are patterns or signatures of such failures. In this
work, error detection is sometimes called failure pattern detection. When an
error always lead to a failure, then error detection in this case, is similar to
failure prediction. This is because when an error is detected, the likely future
occurrence of failure can be predicted easily, in particular, error detection is
first performed to enable prediction. Hence, we use the two terms to mean
the same. Similarly, in this thesis, the term fault detection implies detecting
the manifestations of faults, which are errors. Hence, we sometimes use fault
detection to mean error detection.
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1.3 The Problem
Large-scale HPC systems produce a significant amount of data (error events and
resource utilization data), and these logs contain information about the system’s
activities. Whenever a fault occur, errors may become visible and these errors
can take a particular pattern depending on the fault [43]. The systems can
undergo updates which can change the nature and behaviour of faults and the
patterns of error events produced. Similarly, abnormal activities in the system
can be experienced due to these faults. The abnormality can be seen in the way
the system resources are being used, which is captured in the resource utilization
data. If the system administrator does not act upon the errors, an error or some
can lead to system failure.
The research questions this thesis seek to answer include: first, can the huge
event logs be reduced by filtering redundant ones and still contain useful ones
for failure analysis? Secondly, how effective is using event logs and resource
utilization/usage data for error detection? And can errors be detected early
even when it is not visible yet to enable early prevention of failure?
1.4 The Approach
In this thesis, we develop an approach to error detection based on the analysis
of event logs. Owing to the properties of the systems and the nature of the
data available (huge, unlabelled and semi-structured), we chose an unsupervised
approach to error detection. In this method, the characteristics of the system
based on the normal and the rare abnormal behaviours, error detection is made
without having a prior knowledge of the patterns. A supervised learning ap-
proach [115] requires an adequate knowledge of the system, its faults and failure
patterns and properly labelled for training to take place. This can be difficult
given that system updates usually change these patterns and manual labelling
of the data can be overwhelming even for experts. Unlike supervised learning
method, the unsupervised approach can still capture these patterns even in the
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presence of updates and without the need for complete expert knowledge and
labelling of the event data. The fact that failures are rare events makes an
unsupervised approach relatively more viable as the problem can be seen as an
anomaly detection. The general overview of the unsupervised approach is de-
picted in Figure 1.4. It involves extracting features from sequences of event logs
and usage data in order to determine if a sequence is failure inducing or not. In
some cases, a preprocessing of the data is required.
 Resource Usage 
Data 
Event Logs  
Preprocessing 
Feature Extraction 
       Detection  
Figure 1.4: An overview of the unsupervised detection approach
1.5 Thesis Contributions
This thesis is focused on achieving fault tolerant systems with particular con-
tributions to development of a novel approach for error detection and recovery
in computer systems. We performed experiments on three different data sets
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from two production systems and the results demonstrated excellent perfor-
mance; outperforming established error detection methods in the field of fault
tolerance. We make the following specific contributions in this thesis:
• We proposed a novel and generic approach to log filtering that not only
filters redundant events, but also preserves events that are not similar
but causality-related. This preserves event patterns that can serve as
precursors to failures.
• We proposed a novel clustering-based failure pattern detection approach
that utilizes the inherent characteristics of faults to detect the presence of
errors in computer systems.
• A novel method for error detection based on the combination of event logs
and resource utilization data is proposed. This method uses the anomaly
in the use of computer resources and the informativeness of event patterns
to detect errors in the system.
• We propose an approach for detecting recovery patterns in system data.
These are patterns which characterise errors which do not eventually lead
to failure. The approach, which is based on change point detection, identi-
fies such patterns based on the consistencies in which resources are utilised.
• A novel method for increasing the error handling time window is proposed.
This is the time window for which error handling techniques can be applied
and it must be large enough for such techniques to complete. Our method
increases this time by detecting errors early from minimal error symptoms.
• In this thesis, we provide a taxonomy and a comprehensive survey of fault
tolerance techniques.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
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Chapter 2 contains a taxonomy and overview of the current work in the field
of dependability in large-scale systems. Particularly, the chapter describes fault
tolerant methods with error detection approaches categorised under supervised,
unsupervised and other methods. The chapter also reviews system recovery
methods.
Chapter 3 briefly describes the system model for which the approaches can be
applied. This chapter gives an overview on two supercomputing systems (Ranger
and Blue Gene/L) and the data collected from these systems for the experiments
performed. It further explains the fault model assumed in this thesis and some
basic terminologies related to the use of the data and the approaches used.
Chapter 4 presents a filtering method used to reduce the redundant events in
the log data. The chapter further details a clustering approach for detecting
error event patterns from these logs that are symptomatic to failure.
Chapter 5 focuses on utilizing both resource utilization data and event logs to
detect failure-inducing behaviour in systems. The chapter details the approach
which obtains anomalous behaviour in systems from resource utilization data
combined with the nodes’ behaviour captured by the event log entropies to
detect the error patterns. The chapter explores other methods of improving
failure pattern detection for which recovery pattern detection was proposed
based on change point detection.
Chapter 6 details the approach for improving the time for which error handling
can be performed. This stems from the fact that with future systems projected
to have reduced mean times to failure, it is necessary that identification of failure
leading errors should be done early enough to enable error handling techniques
to complete successfully.
Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the thesis. The chapter discusses the
implication of each approach presented as well as their limitations. The chapter
also provides directions for future work and further research.
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Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The complexities associated with large-scale systems are often challenging; fail-
ures become an everyday challenge to deal with. Determining the causes and
impact of these failures can be elusive sometimes. With increasing and proven
approaches to preventing faults from resulting in failures, it becomes important
that symptoms of failures (errors) manifesting as a result of the presence of
faults in a system are detected on time. In fault tolerance, successful error de-
tection provides a platform for system recovery to be invoked in order to prevent
failure. In this chapter, we survey different published work that relates error
detection and methods used for performing system recovery. This survey follows
the taxonomy illustrated in Figure 2.1. We discuss methods for error detection
in which they can be categorised as supervised, unsupervised or other methods.
By other methods, we mean those which can not be clearly categorised under
supervised or unsupervised, or are the combination of both. We discuss error
detection methods in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 contains system recovery methods.
We summarise and conclude this chapter in Section 2.4.
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2.2 Error Detection
We discuss major approaches and related work on error detection. These meth-
ods are categorised into two: unsupervised or supervised approaches. By su-
pervised, we mean methods for which learning (training) of the error patterns
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is done from known data before testing is performed on unlabelled data. Un-
supervised method on the other hand, are methods for which detection is done
without any knowledge of previous patterns.
2.2.1 Unsupervised Methods
Detecting error patterns for any proactive failure avoidance measure has received
much attention from researchers. Learning such patterns in an unsupervised way
has proven to be effective. Generally, these techniques share a common purpose:
detecting faults and/or failure inducing errors in systems. These techniques may
differ in approaches; we explain the frequently used ones.
Entropy Approach
An entropy-based approach to detecting failure inducing patterns has also been
shown to be successful in the domain. It involves capturing the entropy of
the system from the event logs. Particularly, several approaches have been
developed [106] [94] to detect alerts in logs of large-scale distributed systems.The
concept of entropy has also been demonstrated to be useful in detecting changes
in the behaviour of distributed systems components [26].
Basically, entropy-based detection methods [106], [93] based its motivation
on the premise that in large-scale distributed systems, similar computers cor-
rectly executing similar jobs should produce similar logs. That is, they should
produce similar content or line tokens. The method leverages the information
that each line token carries with respect to the node that produced it. The
approach is as follows: Given W as a set of unique terms (tokens) formed by
concatenating line tokens with its position in line, C is the total number of
nodes, then the matrix M = |W | × C, with xw,c as the total number of counts
of term w appears in messages generated by node c. To capture the uneven
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distribution of the terms among nodes, given G vectors of |M | weights, then,
gw = 1 +
1
log2
C
C∑
c=1
pw,c log2(pw,c) (2.1)
where pw,c is the number of times term w occurs on nodes c divided by the
number of times it occurs on any other node,
pw,c =
xw,c
C∑
c=1
xw,c
(2.2)
The next step is to obtain the informativeness of the nodes, Nodeinfo, within
nodehours (all event lines within an hour by a node) and rank them based on
how many high information terms are contained in each. Hence, let H be the set
of all nodehours, and let Y be the |W | × |H| matrix where yw,c,j is the number
of times term w occurs in nodehour Hcj , then the Nodeinfo for each nodehour
is given as:
Nodeinfo(Hcj ) =
√√√√ |W |∑
w=1
(gwlog2(yw,c,j))2 (2.3)
where each nodehour is ranked based on decreasing value of Nodeinfo. Those
with high Nodeinfo are considered to have alerts(errors) [106]. This approach
was applied on logs of supercomputers with good result.
Another entropy based approach is proposed in [94]. This approach charac-
terises system behaviour from system logs. Similar to Oliner et al. [106], this
approach leverages the entropy-based information content of the logs within a
spatio-temporal partition. A clustering is applied to the information content of
these partitions to characterise failure and normal behaviour. In particular, the
information content values corresponds to the entropies of the message types
within a spatio-temporal partition. These entropy values serve as attributes to
the clustering algorithm. The clusters formed are assumed to describe differ-
ent internal states of the system for which a failure inducing or normal state is
detected. The authors argued that the message types provided a better perfor-
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mance rather than using every field of an event log. In [53] the authors utilise
entropy of events logs and event characteristics to detect failure patterns in logs.
One of the advantages of entropy - based methods is that they can be im-
plemented easily so long as features can be captured accurately. However, the
approach suffers from the following disadvantages:
• Since it depends on obtaining the informativeness of terms of the log
events, it can be computationally expensive as the increase in the number
of the terms, the higher the size of the features to be considered.
• Its performance is dependent on the nature of logs, that is, it performs
poorly on logs where faults are not characterised by presence of high event
messages.
• It requires system logs to be decomposed into spatio-temporal partitions;
the act of partitioning may not capture the desired events with the required
time window or partition, hence decreasing the detection accuracy.
Anomaly-based Approach
The challenge of error detection can also be seen as anomaly detection problem.
Anomalous pattern detection assumes the existence of a normal pattern for
which an abnormal one can be viewed as a deviation from the former. We discuss
some of the approaches widely and recently used under different categories as
follows:
1. Statistical anomaly detection methods: Statistical approaches take
two steps, the training and the test stages. At the training stage, a sta-
tistical model is built based on the historical data; this is used for both
supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection; here we explain the unsu-
pervised approaches. Similar to work in [67], Das et al. [27] proposed an
approach that scans through categorical data and detects a subset which
is thought to be anomalous. In this method, groups of records rather than
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individual records are assumed to substantially increase detection. It cal-
culates the anomaly score of the subset of the records. The anomalousness
is the maximization of anomaly scores over all subsets where those that
deviates abnormally from others are likely anomalous. This is achieved by
learning a Bayesian network model over the training data where the condi-
tional probabilities of each attribute of a record are calculated forming the
anomaly scores. This approach was applied on categorical data. Similar
approaches can be found in [151]. Most of these techniques assume the
knowledge of the underlying data distribution. Even though this method
was not used for detection of errors, it can be adopted easily. The logs
which are the records can be categorised or other to obtain their anomaly
scores.
The frequency or histogram approach is a non-parametric method that
constructs a histogram of normal and anomaly data. Particularly, the
feature-wise histogram is constructed where by, at the test stage, the prob-
ability of each feature is obtained. The anomaly score is then calculated
by summing the probability values of each feature, which is calculated as
follows:
anomaly score =
∑
k∈X
wk
(1− pk)
|K| (2.4)
where wi is the weight assigned to the feature k, pk is the probability
distribution of feature k and K is the set of features.
This approach is well-applied in fraud detection [35], intrusion detection
[148], [149].
Another work that statistically models the normal behaviour of systems
in order to detect failures as anomaly is reported in [19]. That is, the nor-
mal system’s behaviour is modelled for the internal measurements of the
systems to be tested against any deviation. This method utilizes subspace
mapping between system inputs and the internal measurements to model
their dependencies. It further leverages on the statistical method, canon-
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ical correlation analysis (CCA) to discover highly correlated subspaces
between the sets of variables. The authors further proposed a method
called principal canonical correlation analysis to capture the variance be-
tween the two features (system inputs and internal measurements). The
authors reported good detection based on the deviation observed of inter-
nal measurements from the system normal models.
In [149], the authors describe an approach that detects outliers in categor-
ical data. The method addresses the problem using a statistical learning
approach which is an online unsupervised learning process of a proba-
bilistic model. The method performs online learning and updating as
follows: Whenever a data point input is given to the system, it learns the
probabilistic model using an online discounting learning algorithm. The
input data point is then scored based on the learnt model; with high score
indicating a high chance of it being an outlier. This approach was im-
plemented and tested on network intrusion detection data for KDD cup
1999 and the rare event detection for pathology dataset of the Australian
Health Insurance Commission. The authors recorded good detection.
2. Distance - based: These methods detects failure patterns based on
the dissimilarity and rarity of certain inputs from others. A dissimilarity
threshold is defined in this case. We discuss some distance-based anomaly
methods as follows.
Xu et al. [147] formalised problem detection in systems as an anomaly
detection problem. Their assumption for this is that an unusual occur-
rence of error log message is often an indication of a problem. However, a
single event would not be sufficient to point to a problem, and even groups
of events may not, but relationships among events can. In the approach,
features are created to capture the relationship among events for possible
identification of abnormal ones using the source codes and logs. It creates
features that succinctly capture the correlation among the log messages
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and perform detection using PCA extracted anomaly vectors from the fea-
tures. The approach used on console logs is summarised as follows: Parse
logs and source codes to extract useful schema, then create features that
capture correlation among events (state ratio vectors and message count
features). This is done by combining source codes and message logs where
the hidden log schema is extracted. This feature vectors are used as in-
puts to the PCA and detection algorithm. In employing PCA for anomaly
detection, the feature vectors are labelled as normal or anomalous. The
intuition is that, highly correlated feature vectors can be identified and
anomalies are assumed to be rare. Therefore, feature vectors that deviate
from the correlated pattern are likely to be anomalous. To identify ab-
normal vectors, a distance from the uncorrelated subspace to the normal
subspace is calculated to determine the abnormality of a vector. That is,
a vector v is projected onto an abnormal space va, the squared distance
is the squared prediction error (SPE) calculated thus:
SPE = ||va||2 (2.5)
and va = (1− AAT )v, where A = [a1, a2, ..., ak] is the k formed principal
components by PCA.
Since it was assumed that the abnormal vectors are distant from the nor-
mal subspace, then detection of abnormal vectors is simple: flag v as
abnormal if SPE is greater than certain defined threshold.
This method was shown to have good detection rate. However, it requires
access to source codes of programs, which are not readily available. PCA
computation can be costly; hence this might not be suitable for an online
detection.
Lan et al. [80] present an anomaly based detection technique that finds
the abnormal nodes in large-scale distributed systems. The approach con-
sists of three steps for detecting the abnormal nodes using system data.
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The first step involves transforming the data from multiple data types
to a single one to enable detection. Specifically, it involves converting
variable-spaced time series to constant-spaced ones, removing noise etc.
The result of this step is a feature matrix formed for each of the nodes.
The second step deals with feature extraction; where principal component
analysis (PCA) and independent component analysis (ICA) are used to
extract useful features to be used for detection. Lastly, the abnormally
behaving nodes (outliers) are identified using a proposed outlier/anomaly
detection algorithm. In order to identify the nodes that are anomalous
or significantly dissimilar from others, the authors utilised Euclidean dis-
tance. Hence, given two data points ya ∈ <s and yb ∈ <s, then, distance
is given by:
d(ya, yb) =
√√√√ s∑
i=1
(ya, i− yb, i)2 (2.6)
Therefore, the nodes further away are anomalous. The authors demon-
strated that the method is able to detect anomalous nodes with high
specificity.
In our method, entropy is extracted as one of the features of event sequence.
We combined with resource usage data for which an anomaly score was obtained.
Detection is achieved based on features extracted and the anomalousness of the
resource usage of the system.
Clustering Methods
In this context, clustering is aimed at grouping similar inputs patterns together.
It is believed that those that are likely to be failures are rare, hence detection
can be performed, sometimes, in conjunction with other methods.
Fu et al. [37] developed a method that exploits spatial and temporal corre-
lations for failure prediction in coalition of systems. In this work, the authors
first identified failure signatures form the running system and then developed a
covariance model that can adjusted in time to measure the temporal correlation
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of events and further show their spatial correlation using stochastic model. Both
temporal and spatial correlations are used to model failure propagation in the
system. They further developed a clustering algorithm that groups signatures
based on the correlations observed. The clusters formed are used to predict
future occurrence of failure.
In [119], a clustering-based approach is proposed for detecting abnormal
events. They achieved this by first, extracting relevant features and then pro-
posed a proximity clustering that groups patterns of events based on the their
semantic relatedness. The sparsely clustered features are believed to be anoma-
lous or abnormal. This approach was used to detect abnormal events from a
surveillance cameras system. It can be adopted and used for detecting failures
in logs of large-scale distributed systems. This can be done by creating useful
features from the logs that describes correlation among events; then applying
clustering to separate normal from abnormal features. Another work that em-
ploys clustering for detecting failures in large-scale distributed systems is found
in [82]. The work used clustering with gossip-base algorithm to perform this.
The clustering groups messages based on location while the gossip-based algo-
rithm is aimed at removing uncertainty from massive logged messages and also
reduce the detection time. The authors did not elaborate on the performance of
the detection approach but demonstrated how it can incorporate existing meth-
ods to reduce detection time. Our clustering approach is different; we obtain
clusters of similar events to enable extraction of features of patterns particu-
larly entropy and mutual information. These features are then used for error
detection.
Signal Analysis Methods
Gainaru et al., [43, 44] proposed a hybrid method that uses signal processing and
data mining techniques to predict faults using logs. This approach is motivated
by the fact that the behaviour of event types of HPC systems and how the
behaviour is affected by errors overtime can be captured. The hybrid approach
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characterises event types and detect faults and normal patterns in event logs.
The approach extracts and represents the event types as signals where these
signals are appropriately characterised and an anomaly detection method is
applied to identify anomalous signals. The authors went further to implement
this this as online outlier detection. The oﬄine event correlation/analysis is
combined with online monitoring and detection of outliers for identification
of any deviation from known normal signal patterns for prediction of possible
failures. The authors reported good results for predicting failures.
In [102, 105, 107] the authors proposed methods that can address several
problems in production systems. Such problems include: abnormal interactions
among components and identifying these bad behaviours of systems. The com-
ponents behaviour is captured as “surprise”; that is, measuring how anomalous
a component is. These anomalies (surprises) are captured as anomaly signals.
The anomaly signals are obtained by finding deviations from known models of
normal component behaviour. In this method, the degree of anomalousness of
each signal is retained rather than discretizing them into either abnormal or
normal. In particular, the method represents behaviour of components as sig-
nals and computes the anomaly score for each to be able to identify abnormal
behaving components. The anomaly score is computed by comparing the his-
togram of a recent window of component behaviour with the entire history of
behaviours of the components. Kullback Leibler divergence [77] is computed
between the probability distributions of the observations. This provides the dis-
tance or how each distribution differs from the other. Those with high deviation
from the normal are considered anomalous signals.
The authors went further to construct a Structured-Influence-Graph (SIG)
from the anomaly signals. This graph shows the correlations between compo-
nents. Even though these methods did not target the detection or prediction
of failures, the steps are easily adopted for this purposes as explained by the
authors. The models of component behaviours can be used to predict any fu-
ture occurrence of failure. The conversion of these behaviours to signals and
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the using anomaly detection to obtain anomalous signals is indeed a good way
to detect faulty components in large-scale systems. The online version of this
method is detailed by the authors in [102].
Rule-based Methods
[38] explored a rule-based method of predicting failure events in logs of large-
scale systems. They mine correlations in events by leveraging on the unique
characteristics of the events. The approach first proposed a new algorithm
called Apriori-LIS that mines rules from events representing correlation among
them. These rules are then represented using a proposed Events Correlation
Graphs (ECGs). The prediction algorithm is built based on the ECGs where
the probabilities of failure events are calculated based on correlation seen in
the vertices of the ECGs. The authors reported good prediction results when
applied on logs of production systems. One major advantage of this approach
is its ability to generate rules based on events correlation for effective detection.
Model-based Methods
Cormode [26] introduced an approach that models continuous distributed mon-
itoring of streams of data in a distributed computer system. A function for these
streams of observation is computed. This method can be used for monitoring
usage of compute nodes for detection of abnormal usage patterns of the nodes.
These abnormal usage patterns are pointers to failure.
In their work [40], Gabel et al., proposed an approach for detecting faults
from large-scale systems. The authors hypothesized that system failures are
not caused by abrupt changes, rather, by the resultant effects of long time sys-
tems performance degradation. This idea is contrary to the norm, where abrupt
changes are seen as pointers to failure, even though this hypothesis may have
some support from work in [120]. The authors argued that machine behaviour
that is indicative of faults presence would eventually result in failure. Hence,
they developed a framework that uses standard numerical counter readings of
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the different machines to compare those performing similar tasks within the
same time frame. Anyone that significantly deviates from the others is tagged
suspicious. This idea is similar to those presented in [74, 106]. A statistical
model is used to capture the behaviours of the machines. The authors imple-
mented the detection framework using three test algorithms: the Sign test [30],
Tukey test algorithm [133] and the Local Outlier Factor algorithm [12]. The
authors reported a good detection of outlier machines.
In [62], models of different hardware component failures is constructed from
a 5 years logs collected from a HPC system. The failure models are based
on each components usage and capture the correlation between components.
The authors demonstrated that these application-centric models are useful in
performing other system reliability methods like checkpointing. These models
can be utilised easily for performing detection of these failing components.
Log Filtering and Error Detection Methods
Filtering or pre-processing logs for failure analysis is an important process that
is done for any proper log analysis [88]. It eliminates redundant events from logs
while keeping the useful ones or those patterns that are important for failure
analysis. The normal log filtering [88] approach removes repeated events within
certain time window. Specifically, similar events that are logged in sequence
within a defined time window are filtered with only one kept. The challenge with
this method is that, it can remove fault events that are relevant for analysing
causal correlations among events. Zheng et al. [154] proposed an approach that
can filter causality-related events or what they termed ‘semantically redundant‘
events. Their idea is that events may be different but may always co-occur
together. This co-occurrence is not normal, hence they believe such events have
similar root-cause and can be filtered. In their approach, redundancy from
both temporal and spatial viewpoint is considered. This method can preserve
useful patterns and was shown to be better than normal filtering. However, the
methodology is log-specific: that is, it is dependent on the severity level of logs.
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Most production systems’ logs do not have that. A general approach is more
suitable.
Unlike theirs, this work assumes that temporal events must occur in sequence
to be removable and we believe that causality-related but semantically unrelated
events are patterns or signatures to failure, therefore, are not filtered.
Gainaru et al. [42] proposed a log filtering approach to enhance failure de-
tection. This method clusters similar events that tend to occur massively in
sequence. In addition to clustering, Makanju et al. [95] went further to index
(IDs) the result of the clustered logs for easier use by any log analysis algorithm.
these clusters represents the different event types of the logs. The authors mainly
focus on extracting the message types that can be used for indexing, visualiza-
tion or model building. One of the caveats of this approach is that it clusters
events/message types that are believed to have been produced by the same print
statement and their occurrences is non-overlapping. Another approach that use
clustering can be found in [70]. By contrast, the method in [55] can cluster
non-overlapping events together. In [3], two algorithms for discovering patterns
in systems event logs we proposed. The first is the text clustering algorithm
which automatically discovers templates generating the messages. The second
algorithm discovers patterns of messages in the system. The clustering algo-
rithm focuses on creating a dictionary of event types from the text messages
with no aim of discovering any faulty pattern, but only different patterns that
can be discovered. In [53] the authors went further by discovering and detect-
ing patterns that are symptomatic to system failure. The authors group similar
patterns through clustering based on the events similarities.
In their work, Gainaru et al. [41] [43] proposed a method for analysing sys-
tems’ generated messages by extracting sequences of events that frequently oc-
cur together. This provides an understanding of the pattern of failures and
non-failure events. Their approach uses dynamic time window. They also use
signal analysis technique to characterise the normal behaviour of system and
how faults affects it; in this case, they will be able to detect deviations from the
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normal.
[114] developed a method that ranks log messages deemed useful to the
users. Their approach assumed that most frequently occurring messages are
ranked higher using an unsupervised algorithm.
Another approach that ranks logs for failure detection is [129]. Similar
to [106], the ranking is based on the location of a text word in a message
and similarity in the workload performed by computer nodes where they are
assumed to have generated similar log messages. They demonstrated that the
method with information entropy of logs produces a very low false positive rate
(0.05%) for failure event detection. One of the challenges of this method is that
it may not detect failures characterised by presence of few events since it will
receive low ranking.
In their approaches,[23] [24] produced a diagnostic tool FDiag, which uses
the combination of message template extraction, statistical event correlation
and episode construction to identify significant events that led to compute node
soft lockup failure in Ranger supercomputer system. Events which are highly
correlated with the failure are extracted as episodes.
2.2.2 Supervised Methods
Supervised detection approaches learn the patterns of errors or failure inducing
and nonfailure inducing through a supervised training algorithm. After learning
from the labelled data, it produces models that can be used to classify, from
test data, the patterns identified as failure and non-failure by the model.
Machine Learning
Machine learning methods performs function approximation where the target
values are represented by the function mimicking the input data. The target
function could be the probability of a failure occurrence. Hence, the output of
the target function is a boolean indicating either it is a failure or not. Another
category is classification where the target is mostly binary values. It involves
25
2. Literature Review
coming to a decision without having to build a target function. We survey
papers that use machine learning in the section.
The authors of [99] combined simulation models and machine learning method
to perform detection of faults. Unlike other normal machine learning approaches
reported in [100], where failure and non-failure patterns are detected, this ap-
proach performs classification of more categories of failure. It first, simulate
models of the system, then using Neural Network method, it learns different
faulty and non- faulty condition from the model signals. This method was
validated on inverter-monitor systems and not distributed computer systems.
However, this approach, similar to [100], can be adopted for failure detection in
the cluster systems. More machine learning methods that were used to detect
hard drive failure are detailed in [132]. They modelled the problem as a sequence
labelling challenge, where, a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is used to model
these failures as probabilistic models. They extracted 68 features from hard
drive data where HMM is trained for each of the supported feature. The time
series Self-Monitoring and Reporting Technology (SMART) data is labelled as
either fail or good. Yamanishi and Maruyama [148] came up with a different ap-
proach to HMM. In their approach, dynamic systems behaviour is represented
using a mixture of Hidden Markov Models; these models are learned using an
online discounting learning algorithm. Failure pattern detection is done sub-
sequently based on anomaly score given to observed patterns. This approach
basically utilises the HMM for learning the models.
Other HMM-based methods for error detection similar to [148] is detailed
in [153]. In their work, Murray et al. [100] compared several machine learning
techniques for detecting or predicting failures in hard drives. They formulated
the problem as a rare event detection in time series data of noisy and non-
parametrically distributed data. They developed a detection algorithm based
on many other learning frameworks and Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier to perform
detection. Support vector machine (SVM) was also used. Experiments demon-
strated that SVM, a hyperplane separation technique outperforms the Na¨ıve
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Bayesian classifier implementation.
Fulp et al. [39] proposed a new spectrum-kernel SVM approach to predict
failure events from log files of computer systems. The approach extracts mes-
sages in a sub-sequence or sliding window to predict likely failure. The fre-
quency observation of the messages in each sub-sequence is used as an input to
the SVM. The SVM then classifies the messages as either failure or non-failure.
Other methods that combine SVM and other classifiers for detection can be
found in [118, 152]. The work in [152] first extracts sets of features that ac-
curately captures the characteristics of failures. The authors then investigated
four classifiers (rule-based, SVM, Nearest Neighbour and a customised Nearest
Neighbour) to detect failures. They reported good results when applied on an
IBM BlueGene/L log data, achieving better performance with the customised
Nearest Neighbour method.
Fronza et al. [36] presented an approach that predict failure of systems using
log files based on random indexing (RI) and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
They presented a two-step approach where, firstly, given labelled (failure and
non-failure) sequences of logs files representing a change in system state, a fea-
ture vector is constructed. These features are created using RI. It is a word
space model that accumulates vectors based on occurrence of words in context.
This approach does not require the data to undergo further dimensional reduc-
tion since it forms this vectors incrementally. Secondly, SVM is applied on these
data to separate or classify failures and non-failure patterns based on models
formed. This approach was validated on an industrial data and the authors
reported low performance on true positive rate and high true negative rate.
Neural Network (NN) method has long been used in error detection [51].
In his work, Niville [101] explained a standard neural networks method for de-
tection of failure patterns in large-scale engineering plants. A fully connected
cascaded neural network approach was described in [64] for detecting or iden-
tification of sensor failures of aircraft. The authors reported that out of 150
experiments conducted, only one fault went undetected. A similar work has
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been done and presented in [51], except that, this method uses the traditional
NN. Similar work have been proposed for detecting failure in automotive en-
gines [144]. However, the authors were able to verify their technique by simula-
tion. Similarly, Selmic and Lewis in [121] presented a neural network approach
that identifies and detects fault in nonlinear systems. The approach used how-
ever, is a multimodel NN. An NN of the system that emulates the behaviour of
system is trained oﬄine based on known nonlinear models. At the simulation
part, the neural net is compared to the real non-linear plant for detecting pos-
sible failure. The authors did not show detection accuracy but demonstrated
how the estimation error converges asymptotically. An approach that combines
models of support vector machines and back-propagation neural network is de-
tailed in [155]. This method was aimed at improving drive failure detection in
large scale storage systems. The models are tested on a real-world dataset and
was shown to have high detection accuracy. These methods can be used for
detecting failures in computer systems if models of the system failure signatures
can be obtained and trained using NN.
Lee et al. [83] presented an approach that captures the contents of fault
trees and detect faults using decision trees. A decision tree is built and trained
from the sample data containing faulty and non-faulty events. The authors
presented the result of such classification as a diagnostic decision tree. This
tree helps reveal unknown fault paths also.
Rule-based
In the context of supervised approach, rules are generated which reflects normal
and faulty states of the computer systems. These rules are used to detect
failure patterns from system inputs. [139] described a rule-based method that
first characterised the target events by observing those that frequently precedes
it within a given time window. An algorithm is proposed that searches these
targets and preceding events in order to generate rules describing the behaviour
of the patterns. The authors further introduced association rule mining [2]
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and classification with consideration to the time of occurrence of events. This
combination enabled the building of robust rule-based models that can be used
to detect or identify rare events. The authors reported that the time window
affects the performance of this method.
System Model-based
Model-based detection has long received attention [143] [47]. The authors of
these papers surveyed works that utilised models to detect and isolate failures in
dynamical systems and production plants respectively. A mathematical model
of the system and its problems (e.g., memory leaks, sensor biases, equipment
deterioration) are detected when there is deviation from the normal system
model signatures. [7] developed a Markov Bayesian Network model for predict-
ing failures. This method combines causal information and updates the model
estimator with new observations.
Vaidyanathan and Trivedi [137] proposed a semi Markov reward model
(measurement-based) to estimate the rate of exhaustion of operating system
resources. The authors utilised statistical cluster analysis to identify the various
network workload states. This is done through clustering of the measurements
taken. Next, the authors build a state-space model and then define a reward
function based on the rate of resource exhaustion corresponding to each resource.
The state reward defines the rate of change of the modelled resources. In order
to estimate the rates, a linear function is fitted to the data. This approach
estimates the time until resource exhaustion by computing the expected reward
rate at steady state from the semi Markov model.
2.2.3 Other Methods
Methods that combine both supervised and unsupervised are highlighted in this
section.
Yamanishi et al. [148], concerned with the challenge of detecting outliers
from unlabelled data, propose a method that combines both supervised and
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unsupervised approaches to detect outliers. The authors perform detection as
follows: First, a method [149], an unsupervised online detection of outliers is
applied to the data. This method obtain an anomaly score for each data point.
A high anomaly score indicates that the data point is likely an outlier and lower
scores indicating less possibility of an outlier. The data is then labelled based
on the scores with higher scores labelled as “positive” and low scores labelled
as “negative”. From these labelled data, a supervised learning method is used
to generate outlier detection rules. These rules are generated using stochastic
decision list (used as classifier). For the selection of the rules, it utilises the
principle of minimising extended complexity. Failure detection is then done
using the generated rules on any input data. With the use of system logs, a
proper method for extracting patterns that can capture the outlierness of the
input sequences can be used, then an anomaly score is assign to each sequence.
Finally, a classification algorithm can be used to generate rules to be used for
detection.
2.3 System Recovery
The processes involved in achieving fault tolerance include error detection and
system recovery. Rollback, rollforward techniques like checkpointing, job mi-
gration etc., are applied whenever a fault is detected.
2.3.1 Checkpointing
A checkpoint is an identified area in a program at which fault free system
states or status information that would allow restarting of processes at a future
time is saved. The process of saving system state and status information is
called checkpointing [73]. Periodically, checkpointing process is done and this
checkpoint become points of restart whenever a failure noticed [73], [32]. We
explain some few checkpointing methods used in distributed systems.
Checkpointing in current large-scale clusters performed on disk under the
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control of I/O node is limited by bandwidth of that I/O node. According
to [15, 45], coordinated checkpointing would not scale for future exascale sys-
tems because, their design is centred on energy efficiency. Furthermore, El-Sayed
and Schroeder [33] provide an extensive study on the energy/performance trade-
offs associated with checkpointing and pointed out that periodic checkpointing
methods would not scale perfectly in exascale systems [45, 110] and requires
further improvement. The best option possible in this case is to save check-
points on local nodes. However, the disadvantage of this method is that it
can only recover from software faults, since nodes with checkpoints could also
fail. Preventive checkpointing methods are promising as they avoid the earlier
mentioned challenges. In this methods, prediction is done based on successful
detection of non-fatal precursor events. In a sense, early effects of faults must be
detected in order for checkpointing to be triggered. Some approaches [21, 29, 57]
circumvents checkpointing to provide fault tolerance.
Checkpointing in Distributed Systems: Checkpointing is useful, however,
it is also more difficult in distributed systems due to the fact that there is no
global clock to bring synchronization to checkpoint streams. The checkpointing
methods are discussed under the following:
1. Message Logging Techniques
In this technique, processes save their states independently and logging of
inter-process messages [141]. Most of the checkpointing algorithms based
on message passing techniques are a variant of Candy & Lamport algo-
rithm [18]. They proposed an algorithm that takes a global snapshot of
distributed systems. It assumes a distributed system contain a finite num-
ber of processors and channels. The algorithm builds the global state of
the system by harmonizing the processors; the states are logged at check-
pointing time. A marker messages are used to identify those coming from
different checkpoint intervals. According to the authors, a central node
first initiates the checkpoint algorithm and then other nodes follow after
receiving the special marker message. Other variants of the algorithm are
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proposed by [86, 138]
2. Coordinated Checkpointing Techniques
This technique involves the coordination of the processes in order to
save their states. The coordination among processes maintains consistent
global state of the system. Messages are used to maintain the coordination
and this adds to the overhead of the method. Kumar and Hansdah [78]
proposed a coordinated checkpointing technique that assumes nodes to
be autonomous and do not block during checkpointing. The method can
work efficiently with non-FIFO channels for which messages could be lost.
In the method, any process can initiate a checkpoint by requesting per-
mission from former coordinator. In essence, multiple coordinators are
allowed; however, a single checkpoint is permitted at a given time.
A coordinated multi-level diskless checkpointing is proposed in [56]. Stem-
ming from the fact that as extreme scale systems are expected to be fully
deployed and the probability of failure of these systems is high, saving
checkpoints on disk posses I/O bandwidth disadvantages. Diskless check-
pointing on the other hand suffers from redundancy problem. The authors
then proposed an N-level diskless checkpointing approach that reduces the
overhead that comes with tolerating simultaneous failure of less than N
processors. This is achieved by arranging in layers, the diskless check-
pointing strategies for a simultaneous failure of the processors. The algo-
rithm follows four steps: The first is the determination of when and which
level of checkpoint to execute; secondly, a consistent processor state is ob-
tained by proper coordination; thirdly, the local memory checkpoints are
obtained and lastly, these in memory checkpoints are encoded to particu-
lar checkpoint processes. The simulation results suggest that the method
is promising and that the impact of inexact checkpoint schedules on the
expected program execution is negligible especially if the checkpoint in-
tervals are close to exact. Other similar but earlier methods are discussed
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in [124] [136] [22]. Most of the methods highlighted in this section are also
referred to as preventive checkpointing methods. One of the challenges
with this method is that it is difficult to prevent a process from receiving
application messages that could make the checkpoints inconsistent. An-
other problem is that computation is blocked during the checkpointing
thereby causing delay.
3. Hybrid Checkpointing Techniques
These techniques are a combination of two or more other checkpointing
techniques. The approaches are mostly improvements on the other tech-
niques or aimed at providing better checkpointing results.
Bouguerra et al. [11] proposed a method that utilises the relationship be-
tween failure prediction and proactive checkpointing in combination with
periodic checkpointing to reduce the effects of failure in the execution time
of parallel applications. The rationale behind this is that the use of proac-
tive checkpointing only is not sufficient enough to ensure a re-start of an
application from the scratch. However, a combination of these methods
can mitigate the effects and improves systems efficiency. In the approach,
a prototyped state-of-the-art failure prediction, fast proactive checkpoint-
ing and periodic checkpointing methods are developed. Furthermore, the
computing efficiency of the combined methods is captured using a mathe-
matical model to obtain the optimal checkpointing interval. The method is
evaluated by simulating the methods on large-scale supercomputer. Their
result demonstrated that computing efficiency could be improved by as
much as 30% using this method and mean time between failures (MTBF)
is improved by a factor of two.
Jangjaimon and Tzeng [71] developed an approach that aims at reduc-
ing the I/O bandwidth bottleneck to remote storage for checkpointing.
The method is an adaptive incremental checkpointing that lowers this
overhead by reducing the checkpoint files. This is done using delta com-
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pression (where only the difference between current and previous file is
written) combined with Markov model to predict points at which con-
current checkpointing can be done. Their method is reported to reduce
applications turnaround time by about 40% when compare with static
periodic checkpointing.
2.3.2 Task Migration
In this, a task is migrated to another node that is immediately available [11]
when node failure is predicted to occur. Task migration eliminates cost associ-
ated with task restart in the face of node failure.
In a bid to avoid the disadvantages that arise with reactive fault tolerance, a
method that complements the reactive approach to fault tolerance with proac-
tive approach is proposed by Wang et al. [142] . Reactive fault tolerance
often suffers from lack of scalability due to I/O requirements; hence, it relies
on manual task resubmission whenever there is a node failure. The author’s
approach monitors the health information of nodes in order to perform earlier
task migration whenever a node begins to show signs of health deterioration.
They proposed a process-level live migration that supports continuous execu-
tion of the task without having to stop and restart again. The job migration
process is described as follows: The health monitoring mechanism is equipped
with sensors where different node properties are monitored. Such properties in-
clude: temperature data, fan speed and voltage. Upon deterioration of health of
a node, it alerts an MPI-based decentralised scheduler. The scheduler chooses a
replacement or destination node from the spare nodes. In the case of unavailable
spare node, one with less workload is chosen. After a node is selected, migration
of task is initiated; the memory snapshot of the process image is migrated to
the destination node. The migration is done until the MPI tasks or processes
are at globally consistent state. Finally, all communications with the MPI tasks
are reconnected from the migrated processes. With experiments performed on
a Linux cluster comprising of 17 compute nodes, the overheads associated with
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the migration was assessed. The result shows that the overhead of live migra-
tion depends on the application and is higher than the execution time of normal
rollback approach. Other similar approaches are seen in [111], [108].
In order to realise reduced system response time, Gupta et al. [52] proposed
a method that adaptively schedules jobs and manages the resources based on
external input. The jobs can be migrated to more processors and can also be
shrunk based on the runtime conditions. Even though the approach focused on
shrinking or expanding scheduler triggered jobs, it can be adopted to move jobs
to safe nodes in the event of failure.
Munk et al. [98] recently proposed a concept that enable task-level migra-
tion in real time system many-core systems. It checks the viability of migrating
a certain task at runtime. The migration is then performed on resources in-
vestigated to be available only. They performed migration through a 3-step
procedure. The first is the decision phase, where, similar to [142], temperature
monitoring and task runtimes profiling information is performed to decide if
migration is necessary. In the case where it is necessary, a migration request
is generated with set of possible destinations. The second is the investigation
stage where the migration request is assessed. The possible destinations are
evaluated for memory availability to store the task, determine if the task can
be completed and when the migration task can best be performed. The third
stage is the execution. It is triggered at the decision stage where the task on
both the source and destination are activated.
The paper’s idea is good, however, it lacks the empirical demonstration of
the viability of the method.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a taxonomy of error detection and system re-
covery approaches for distributed computer systems. The chapter provided a
comprehensive survey of the various methods in the area. The technique we
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present in this thesis is the first to exploit the use of event logs combine with
resource usage data for the task of error detection using an unsupervised ap-
proach.
Contributions of this chapter: The contributions of this chapter are
the provision of comprehensive survey of error detection and system recovery
techniques. To the best of our knowledge, it proposes the first taxonomy of the
methods in the field of fault tolerance.
Most of the techniques discussed in this survey utilise systems data like error
logs for performing detection. In the next chapter, we introduce the system and
the data we use in this thesis.
Relation to other chapters: This chapter explains the previous studies
upon which our approach is built. Hence it provides the fundamental literature
to other chapters. The next chapter explains the systems and fault models upon
which these techniques can be validated.
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System Description, Log Events And Fault Models
In this chapter, we detail the system model (Section 3.1) and the fault models
(Section 3.2). We also explain the production systems (Section 3.3.2) we used
and from which data is collected and we detail the structure of the log file data
(Section 3.4). A summary of the chapter is presented in Section 3.5 including
the chapter’s contributions and relationship to other chapters.
3.1 System Model
A cluster system contains a set of interconnected nodes. These nodes run jobs
that are allocated to them by a job scheduler. A node contains a set of produc-
tion times during which scheduled jobs are executed. The cluster system also
contains a set of software components (e.g. parallel file system) to support job
execution. All the components involved writes log entries to a container. This
is a typical model for most cluster systems like Cray, IBM Blue Gene/L, Ranger
etc.
Specifically, we consider a cluster system CS to consist of the following set
of entities: a set of K jobs, J1 . . . JK , a set of L nodes, N1 . . . NL, a set of
M production time-bins T1 . . . TM , a job scheduler JS and a set of software
components C. The job scheduler JS allocates nodes (and communication
paths among the nodes as required) and production times to each job. Each
node in the cluster system maintains (monotonically increases) its own clock,
and synchronization between the clocks of the nodes is assumed. Each job
Ji : 1 ≤ i ≤ K, node Nj : 1 ≤ j ≤ L, job scheduler JS and any other software
component may write messages to containers U1 . . . Un. Each node Nj and
job Ji may transfer data to and from a file system FS. We assume such a
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cluster system to be a black-box, i.e., access to software code is not permitted.
However, we assume that access to the message logs which contain the failure
events (written in containers U1 . . . Un by the jobs, nodes, job scheduler and any
software component) is permitted.
3.2 Fault Model
We detail the fault models proposed as it relates to the systems investigated in
this thesis.
3.2.1 Categories of Fault Model
In order to enhance and maintain system dependability, experts have been able
to identify certain activities that could occur in a computer system and could
potentially lead to failure. These identified activities are categorized to further
assist in enhancing a system’s fault tolerance. We explain some fault model
categories and their relations to error detection.
Design-Runtime Fault Model
This model classifies faults based on their origin. Faults that emanate as a
result of poor system design are regarded as design faults. Runtime faults on
the other hand occur during systems production stage. These faults do not
foster fault tolerance [6]. At the design stage, fault tolerance techniques are
used to minimise or eliminate (if possible) these flaws using some engineering
methods like system testing, formal specification etc. In situation where flaw-
free system could not be achieved, runtime faults are inevitable. Error detection
can detect such error patterns produced leading to the failure.
Permanent-Transient-Intermittent Fault Model
This model classification focuses on the duration of the faults. Permanent faults
characteristically remain active so long as repairs are not made. These are
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mostly damages to computer hardware. Transient faults occur temporarily and
disappear. This fault may not occur again; an example may be a communication
between node A and node B where a response to a request is not yet available at
that time, but upon a resend of the request, it might be available. Intermittent
faults are defects that occur due to system error and then disappear temporarily
and could appear again. For example, when there is a loose connection in a
system. This fault model is depicted in Figure 3.1, this structure is according
to Siewiorek and Swarz [123] and elaborated in [115]. It can represent both
hardware and software faults. For example, a software runtime fault can be a
result of a wrong design. In relation to error detection, all these faults produces
failure symptoms (error events); these event patterns or mis-behaviour can be
detected to further enhance failure prediction or other failure analyses.
 Physical 
Defect 
Wrong 
System 
Design 
Unstable 
Condition 
Accident 
Error 
Permanent 
Fault 
Service Failure 
Intermittent 
Fault 
Transient 
Fault 
Loose 
Hardware 
Connection 
Figure 3.1: Permanent, Transient and Intermittent fault model
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Hardware-Software-Human Fault Model
This model classifies faults based on the design and the operation of faults. In
particular, the faults caused by hardware malfunction are called hardware faults,
similarly, application-related faults are classified as software faults. Those that
are the results of human activity are classified as human faults. Generally, all
these faults like others explained before, produces error events or patterns that
can depict such system misbehaviour. Error detection, which is a fault tolerance
technique, can be applied to identify these patterns early enough to enable
further proactive measures. In the case where error events are not produced, a
fault may go undetected until a full failure is experienced since there would be
no error patterns or signature for such failure.
Other Fault Models
Other fault models have been proposed; for example, the one by Gray and
Reuter [48]. It is a model that focuses on software faults only. It classifies bugs
based on how they are observed. Barborak et al. [8] characterises faults based
on their behaviour or impact. He showed that some fault becomes difficult to
detect at certain states, e.g. states where processing elements ceases to work.
3.2.2 Ranger and BlueGene/L Fault Models
As mentioned previously, a fault, when activated, could cause an error to exist
in the system. The resulting state is then said to be erroneous. If the error is not
detected and subsequently corrected, it can lead to a system failure [6]. When
errors exist in the system, the system outputs what we call error messages, and
the message part of the log entry captures the nature of the error in the system.
The errors we focused on in this work are those that can lead to system failure [6],
i.e., failure-inducing errors. A failure-inducing sequence consists of sequences of
log messages that end in failure. A failure is typically characterized differently
in different systems, for example, a failure in IBM BlueGene/L is characterized
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by the FAILURE or FATAL severity level while, in the Ranger Supercomputer,
the failures are mostly characterized by a compute node soft lockups messages.
A study of Ranger logs and the expert’s knowledge has shown that soft
lockups are some of the commonly occurring failures found in the Ranger su-
percomputer. Chuah et al. [23] has established that Machine Check Exceptions
(MCE) and Evict/RPC error events signals likely occurrence of soft lockup fail-
ure in the cluster system. MCE is a way the computer’s hardware reports about
an error that it cannot correct. It will cause the CPU to interrupt the current
program and call a special exception handler. Clusters’ mean time to failure de-
creases with increase in nodes, hence making the need for error correction high.
When the kernel logs an uncorrected hardware error, measures can be taken by
the cluster software to rectify the problem by, for example, re-running the job
on another node and/or reporting the failure to the administrator. Therefore,
detection of MCE faults makes it possible to predict failures early. Soft lockup
failure led by Evict/RPC Events are characterized by evict and recovery events.
Chuah et al [24] have verified these hypotheses using a correlation and regression
technique and obtained a high correlation between the MCE and Evict/RPC
events and the soft lockup failure. Other fault events characterizing soft lockup
failure include: memory access violation e.g. segmentation fault (segfault), net-
work errors, internal interrupt conditions etc [25]. However, the sole occurrence
of these faults may not necessarily lead to a failure, but rather a set of commu-
nicating components, each being affected by a fault can lead to system failure.
All these faults falls within the categories of fault model explained earlier in
Section 3.2.1.
3.3 Production Systems
Two production systems were studied in this research as case studies: the
Ranger supercomputer and the Blue Gene/L systems.
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3.3.1 Ranger Supercomputer
The Ranger supercomputer [60], the 15th ranked in the Top 500 supercomputer1
list, consists of 4,048 nodes of which 3,936 are compute nodes and 78 are Lustre
file system nodes. These nodes are connected via a high-speed Infiniband net-
work. Each node generates its own log messages which are all sent to central
logging system. Each node of a Ranger supercomputer runs a Linux Operating
System kernel. Also, each node maintains its synchronization clock and the Sun
Grid Engine powers its job scheduling process and resource management.
The Ranger supercomputer runs a Lustre file storage system. Lustre file-
system is an object-based high performance network file system that performs
excellently for high throughput I/O tasks. It is a widely utilised file system in
the supercomputing world. The file system is made up of:
• Meta-Data Server (MDS) that stores information like permissions, file
names, directories etc. The MDS equally manages file requests from Lustre
clients.
• Object Storage Server (OSS) which provides file I/O services. It also treats
network requests from lustre clients.
• Lustre clients: The Lustre clients include visualization nodes, computa-
tional nodes, login nodes running the lustre paving way for file system
monitoring.
The Ranger supercomputer runs TACC stats [59], an I/O performance mon-
itoring software. It monitors and records the resource usage/utilization by jobs
on each node. The software runs on each node and the data collected on each
of the nodes are logged centrally and synchronised.
3.3.2 The BlueGene/L (BGL) Supercomputer
The BlueGene/L deployed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),
is currently ranked 12th in the Top 500 supercomputers list with a speed of 4.293
1http://www.top500.org/lists/2015/06/
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Pflop/s.
It is made up of 128K PowerPC 440 700MHz processors, that are arranged
into 64 racks. Each rack is composed of 2 midplanes where the jobs are allocated
on each. A midplane, with 1024 processors, contains sixteen node cards where
the compute chips are contained, the input/output (I/O) cards that harbours
the I/O chips and switches (24) where different midplanes connects.
3.4 System Data
Data from Ranger and BlueGene/L supercomputer systems are used in this
research. This section explains the data in detail.
3.4.1 Ranger Event Logs
Most Linux-based cluster systems use the POSIX standard [1] for logging sys-
tem events. This standard allows the freedom of formatting logs, which means
that there are variations in different implementations. For example, different
attributes are used by IBM’s Blue Gene/L and Ranger to represent their com-
ponents. Two different event logs are collected form the Ranger supercomputer
system, they are: the syslog and the rationalized logs (ratlog).
syslog
An example of a Syslogs’ event can be seen below:
Apr 4 15:58:38 mds5 kernel: LustreError: 138-a: work-MDT0000: A client on
nid .*.*.5@o2ib was evicted due to a lock blocking callback to .*.*.5@o2ib timed
out: rc -107
A Ranger syslog event (or log entry) has five attributes, namely: (i) Times-
tamp (Apr 4 15:58:38 ) containing the month, date, hour, minute and seconds
at which the error event was logged. (ii) Node Identifier or Node Id (mds5 )
identifies the nodes from which the event is logged. (iii) Protocol Identifier
(kernel) (iv) Application (LustreError) provides information about the source
of the log entry, and (v) Message (A client on nid *.*.*.5@o2ib was evicted due
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1:   Mar 29 10:00:44   i128-401  kernel:  [8965057.845375] LustreError: 11-0: an error 
occurred while communicating with *.*.*.36@o2ib. The ost_write operation failed with 
-122  
2:   Mar 29 10:00:53  i128-401  kernel:   [8965077.319555] LustreError: 11-0: an error 
occurred while communicating with *.*.*.28@o2ib. The ost_write operation failed with 
-122  
3:   Mar 29 11:27:16  i182-211  kernel:   [8981960.031578] a.out[867]: segfault at 
0000000000000000 rip 0000003351c5b2a6 rsp 00007fffdcd318c0 error 4  
4:   Mar 29 11:27:16  i115-209  kernel:   [2073150.255467] a.out[22921]: segfault at 
0000000000000000 rip 0000003ad725b2a6 rsp 00007fffbf1a6d40 error 4  
5:   Mar 30 10:02:24  i107-308  kernel:   [8966098.630066] BUG: Spurious soft lockup 
detected on CPU#8, pid:4242, uid:0, comm:ldlm_bl_22  
6:   Mar 30 10:02:24  i107-308  kernel:   [8966098.642055] BUG: Spurious soft lockup 
detected on CPU#8, pid, uid:0, comm:ldlm_bl_22 
7:   Mar 30 10:09:25  i107-111  kernel:   [8966563.203631] Machine check events logged  
8:   Mar 30 10:09:51  i124-402  kernel:   [8965663.148499] Machine check events logged  
9:   Mar 30 10:10:22  master    kernel:   LustreError: 
28400:0:(quota_ctl.c:288:client_quota_ctl()) ptlrpc_queue_wait failed, rc: -3 
10:  Apr  1 05:23:54  i181-409  kernel:  [9203054.301173] Machine check events logged  
11:  Apr  1 05:23:58  visbig  kernel:  EDAC k8 MC0: general bus error: participating 
processor(local node response), time-out(no timeout) memory transaction type(generic 
read), mem or  i/o(mem access), cache level generic)  
 
Figure 3.2: Sample Log events for Ranger Supercomputer (syslog)
to a lock blocking callback to *.*.*.5@o2ib timed out: rc -107 ) provides more
information regarding the system event and contains alphanumeric words and
English-only words sequence. The English-only words sequence (A client on nid
was evicted due to a lock blocking callback to timed out) is believed to give an
insight into the error that has occurred. They are referred to as Constant. The
alpha-numeric tokens (*.*.*.5@o2ib ,rc-107 ) also called Variable, are believed
to signify the interacting components within the cluster system. A detailed
example of the Ranger logs is seen in Figure 3.2.
Rationalized logs
Rationalized logs [60] are similar to syslog, however, they contain an additional
field which differentiates them from syslog. This additional information which
is aimed at improving the effectiveness of log-based analysis and fault manage-
ment, adds structure to the POSIX logs. A job-id field is an additional structure
that contains a numeric number assigned to each running job. Other fields are
similar to that of the syslog.
Message logs are mostly regarded as the only means and sources of infor-
mation regarding the workings of a cluster system. It is used as the system
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administrator’s map to diagnosing faults in cluster systems. As the complexity
of a system grows, so does the number of log entries, making the task of the sys-
tem administrators increasingly complex to nearly impossible when faced with
really large log files. The challenge with log data is that they are generally un-
structured, often incomplete, with poor semantics and, most times, they have
no particular message structure. Thus, we process our data by formatting it
into a structure that is uniform and can give us the necessary information we
need for our analysis. A careful investigation of the log entries showed that
there is a pattern of occurrence of events before a failure.
A summary of the logs used in this research is seen in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of Logs used from Production Systems
System Log Size Messages Start Date End Date
Ranger’s syslog 5.6 GB > 2× 107 2010-03-30 2010-08-30
Ranger’s ratlog
4.3 GB > 2× 107 2011-08-01 2012-01-30
1.2 GB > 107 2012-03-01 2012-03-30
Ranger Usage Data 52 GB 2012-03-01 2012-03-30
IBM’s Blue Gene/L 730 MB 4,747,963 2005-06-03 2006-01-04
3.4.2 Ranger Resource Usage Data
Resource usage data are collected by TACC stats [59] at Texas Advanced Com-
puting Center (TACC). Basically, it is a job-oriented and logically structured
version of the conventional Sysstat system performance monitor. TACC stats
records the hardware performance monitoring data, Lustre file-system opera-
tion counts and InfiniBand device usage. The resource usage data collector
is executed on every node and is mostly executed both at the beginning and
end of a job via the batch scheduler or periodically via cron. The collection
of resource use data requires no cooperation from the job owner and requires
minimal overhead.
Each stats file is self-explanatory and it contains a multi-line header, a
schema descriptor and one or more record groups. Each stats file is identi-
fied by a header which contains the version of TACC stats, the name of the
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host and its uptime in seconds. An example of a stats file header is shown, for
clarity:
$tacc_stats 1.0.2
$hostname i101-101.ranger.tacc.utexas.edu
$uname Linux x86_64 2.6.18-194.32.1.el5
_TACC #18 SMP
Mon Mar 14 22:24:19 CDT 2011
$uptime 4753669
A schema descriptor for Lustre network usage parameters is seen below:
!lnet tx_msgs,E rx_msgs,E rx_msgs_dropped,
E tx_bytes,E,U=B rx_bytes E,U=B ...
lnet - 90604803 95213763 1068
808972316287 4589346402748 ...
A schema descriptor has the character ! followed by the type, and followed
by a space separated list of elements or counters. Each counter consists of
a key name such as tx msgs which is followed by a comma-separated list of
options. These options include: (1) E meaning that the counter is an event
counter, (2) C signifying that the value is a control register and not a counter,
(3) W =< BITS > means that the counter is < BITS > wide (32-bits or
64-bits), and (4) U =< STR > signifying that the value is in units specified by
< STR > (e.g.: U=B where B stands for Bytes.). From the schema descriptor
above, lnet - 90604802 gives records of the number of messages transmitted in
the Lustre network.
TACC stats is open sourced and can be downloaded2 and installed on Linux-
based clusters. A list of the counters is shown in Table 3.2.
2https://github.com/TACC/tacc stats
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Table 3.2: List of 96 Elements of Resource Usage Data
Type Element Quantity
Lustre
/work
read bytes, write bytes, direct read,
direct write, dirty pages hits,
dirty pages misses, ioctl, open, close,
mmap, seek, fsync, setattr, truncate,
flock, getattr, statfs,alloc node, setxattr,
getxattr, listxattr, removexattr,
inode permission
23
Lustre
/share
read bytes, write bytes, direct read,
direct write, dirty pages hits,
dirty pages misses, ioctl, open, close,
mmap, seek, fsync, setattr, truncate,
flock, getattr, statfs, alloc node, setxattr,
getxattr, listxattr, removexattr,
inode permission
23
Lustre
/scratch
read bytes, write bytes, direct read,
direct write, dirty pages hits,
dirty pages misses, ioctl, open, close,
mmap, seek, fsync, setattr, truncate,
flock, getattr, statfs, alloc node, setxattr,
getxattr, listxattr, removexattr,
inode permission
23
Lustre
/network
tx msgs, rx msgs, rx msgs dropped,
tx bytes, rx bytes, rx bytes dropped
6
Virtual
memory
pgpgin, pgpgout, pswpin, pswpout,
pgalloc normal, pgfree, pgactivate,
pgdeactivate, pgfault,
pgmajfault pgrefill normal,
pgsteal normal, pgscan kswapd normal,
pgscan direct normal, pginodesteal,
slabs scanned,kswapd steal,
kswapd inodesteal,
pageoutrun, allocstall pgrotated
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3.4.3 BlueGene/L Events logs
The IBM standard for Reliability, Availability, Serviceability (RAS) logs incor-
porates more attributes for specifying event types, severity of the events, job-id
and the location of the event [88, 89]. The RAS events are logged through the
Machine Monitoring and Control System (CMCS) and saved in a DB2 database
engine. The time granularity for which events are logged is less than 1 millisec-
ond. An example of IBM’s Blue Gene/L (BGL) event is seen in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: An example of event from Blue Gene/L RAS log
Rec ID
Event
type
Facility Severity Event Time Location Entry Data
17838 RAS KERNEL INFO
2005-06-03-15
.42.50.363779
R02-M1-N0
-C:J12-U11
instruction
cache parity
error corrected
The RAS events recorded by IBM BlueGene/L CMCS each has the following
attributes:
• REC ID is a sequential number given to each event (incrementally) as
they are reported.
• EVENT TYPE specifies the logging method of the events which are more
of reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS).
• FACILITY indicates the component where the event is flagged. This
may be LINKCARD (problems with midplane switches), APP (flagged
with applications), KERNEL(reported by the operating system), HARD-
WARE (facility related to system’s hardware workings), DISCOVERY (re-
lates initial configuration of the machine and resource discovery), CMCS,
BGLMASTER, SERV NET (all reports events of the CMCS, network and
BGLMASTER), and finally MONITOR facility (which are indicative of
connection, temperature issues of the cards; they are mostly FAILURE
events).
• SEVERITY can be one of these levels: INFO, WARNING, SEVERE,
ERROR, FATAL or FAILURE in increasing order of severity. Regarding
the reliability of the system, INFO events provide more information which
are normal reports. WARNING events are usually related to dysfunctional
cards. SEVERE events provide detailed information about the cards that
are dysfunctional. ERROR events report persistent problems and their
causes. FATAL and FAILURE events indicate more severe conditions
that lead to application or software crashes. Unlike the last two, the first
four severity levels are more of normal information and largely not severe.
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• EVENT TIME is the time stamp for a particular event.
• JOB ID indicates the jobs that detects this event.
• LOCATION denotes where (nodes, cards) an error event occur.
• ENTRY DATA provides a description of the event reported.
3.4.4 Definition of Terms
In this section, basic definition of terms used regarding the event logs used is
provided.
• Event: A single line of text containing various system fields such as
〈timestamp, nodeID, protocol, application〉 together with a log 〈message〉.
The message reports the activity of the cluster system at time captured
by 〈timestamp〉. Such an event is also often called a log entry. Whenever
we refer to the message part of a log entry, we refer to this as the log
message.
• Event logs: A sequence of events containing the activities that occur
within a cluster system.
• Similar events: These are events with similar log messages, based on
some notion of similarity. For example, from Figure 3.2, events 5 and 6
can be considered similar.
• Identical events: These are events believed to be exactly the same
and/or are produced by the same “print” statement, e.g., events 7 and
8 in Figure 3.2.
• Failure event: This is an event that is often associated with and/or
indicative of a system failure.
• Event sequence: A eventsequence consists of one or more events logged
consecutively within a given time period, in order of increasing times-
49
3. System Description, Log Events And Fault Models
tamp. In this paper, we use the terms sequences, patterns and behaviours
interchangeably.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we explained the systems studied in this thesis. We provided de-
tails of the data used for error detection in this chapter; event logs and resource
usage data from productions systems were also explained. We also detailed the
fault models of the systems.
Relation to other chapters: The work in other chapters basically hinges
on the fault, failures and the error events explained in this chapter. The method-
ologies proposed in subsequent chapters for error detection make use of the
system and its data explained in this chapter for verification.
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CHAPTER 4
Error Detection Using Clustering
Event logs are massive files, containing thousands of entries that are reported
within small time intervals. The sheer number of entries makes proper analysis
difficult. The difficulty of the task is compounded by the fact that a large
number of events contained in the log contribute nothing to any meaningful
analysis of the system. The need for preprocessing these logs for any meaningful
and fast analysis cannot be over emphasized.
This chapter detailed our contribution towards preprocessing these logs to
enhance detection and/or eventual prediction of failures. We explain a proposed
failure sequence detection method in this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Unscheduled downtime of large production computer systems, such as supercom-
puters or computer cluster systems, carries huge costs: (i) applications running
on them have to be executed again, potentially requiring hours of re-execution,
and (ii) a lot of effort is required to find and fix the causes of the downtime.
These systems typically generate a lot of data, in the form of system logs, and
these log files represent the main avenue by which system administrators gain
insight into the behaviour of such computer systems [104]. To enhance the
availability of such large distributed systems, the ability to detect errors1 is
important. However, this is a challenging task, given the size and scale of such
systems. Typically system administrators will resort to accessing log files for
error detection.
1An error is the symptom of a fault in the system [6].
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4.1.1 Log Size and Structure
However, due to the size of such data files and the complexity of such sys-
tems, system administrators usually adopt a divide and conquer approach to
analysing the data. An individual line of the system log may not impart much
information to a system administrator due to the lack of context to sufficiently
characterize a message. At the other end of the spectrum, huge log dumps with
interleaved node outputs make it difficult for system administrators to capture
the communication relations among nodes. Researchers have adopted the no-
tion of node hours, which represents all the messages a given node generates in
a given hour [106], to achieve a tractable structure. In any case, a line in the
log file will either be normal, capturing a normal event occurring in the system
or faulty, capturing erroneous behaviour in the system.
Further, recovery in such systems, e.g., checkpointing, are typically compu-
tationally expensive, requiring that these steps are taken if there is a possible
impending failure of the system.
4.1.2 Errors and Failures
Typically, only a proportion of event logs that are errors will lead to system
failures. As such, system designers wish to focus on such errors, which we
term as failure inducing errors2. The presence of an error in the system can be
inferred when faulty events can be observed: failure prediction allows system
administrators to take remedial steps earlier, e.g. by rebooting a node [103].
Several approaches have addressed the problem of error or alert detection such
as [103, 106] or finding the presence of errors in message logs [129]. These
approaches use labelled node hours in conjunction with supervised learning to
predict whether a given node hour contains an alert or fault. Labelling of the
data is usually done manually by experts, which is a very expensive process,
requiring highly specialist knowledge. Therefore, such analysis techniques are
2Henceforth, whenever we say error detection, we mean failure-inducing error detection.
Since the aim is to detect failure-inducing errors.
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invariably expensive due to the size and nature of the log files being processed.
4.1.3 Event Logs Redundancy
The event logs are unstructured and highly redundant, i.e. several lines can be
related to a single event in the system as earlier explained above.
To address the redundancy problem, the logs are typically filtered, or pre-
processed, to retain only those events that are most relevant to the log analysis.
Since these log files are highly redundant, a high filtering rate will significantly
reduce the size of the file, thereby reducing the computation time of the log
analysis process. The filtering or compression techniques (we use both inter-
changeably), are used to remove events that are not deemed useful for analysis.
A common problem with such compression techniques is that they may remove
important information that is pertinent to the analysis phase, as captured by
the targeted high compression or filtering rate [154].
Overall, typical log analysis techniques currently apply a filtering phase to
remove redundancy in the labelled log files. The compressed annotated log files
are then analyzed according to system requirements.
4.1.4 Objectives of the Chapter
This chapter of the thesis seek to achieve the following objectives:
• Propose a method for preprocessing the large logs to reduce it to a manage-
able size without filtering out important events. Particularly, the chapter
seek to detail a novel and generic approach to log filtering that not only
filters redundant events but also preserve events that are not similar but
causality related. This is to preserve event patterns that serve as precursor
to failures. At this filtering stage, timestamps and node ids of the events
becomes crucial.
• Propose an unsupervised approach that eschew fault labeling (as it is com-
putationally expensive to label the data) to detect failure-inducing or er-
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roneous patterns among the unlabeled log message sequences that lead to
system failures.
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 the problem addressed
in the chapter is outlined. Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively include our
methodology for filtering the event logs, transforming the logs into matrix form
and failure pattern detection. In Sections 4.6 and 4.7, we respectively explain the
experimentation methods and discuss the results obtained when applying our
methodology to log data from production systems. We summarise the chapter’s
work in Section 4.8.
4.2 Problem Statement and Methodology Overview
A cluster log contains an interleaving of normal and error messages. When
there is no error in the system, only sequences of normal messages are output.
However, when one or more jobs are affected by errors, these components output
error messages, that are logged. As previously argued, not all (combination of)
errors lead to system failures. Therefore, it becomes important to identify such
sequences that are likely to result in system failures.
Observation of such sequences may then become a precursor to an impend-
ing failure, upon which recovery mechanisms can be built. However, the size
and complexity of such systems, the nature of the log messages (varying accord-
ing to the operating system, networks, file systems), the timing and frequency
of occurrences of these error messages make it difficult to accurately capture
behaviours which are precursors to system failures. Specifically, error detection
is difficult as there are several interactions among system attributes that one
would need to consider to accurately capture failure-inducing behaviours.
We now specify three requirements for a log analysis methodology for error
detection: the methodology needs to (i) have a low computational overhead and
(ii) have a high accuracy for error detection, while minimising the number of
false positives.
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For the first requirement, our approach reduces the number of unique events
under consideration by grouping similar ones together, assigning these events
a unique id, marking them as the same event and using this information to
prune the log data. For the second requirement, we eschew labelling the data
with error or failure information, due to the high overhead associated with such
techniques3. We thus focus on unsupervised learning methods, which constitute
a novel approach to this problem.
Thus, the problem we tackle in this chapter is the following: Given an error
log file E that consists of a sequence of messages m1 . . .mN , where N is the
total number of lines in the log file, a time window τ over the message sequences
such that there is no more than a single failure during τ , we seek to develop
a methodology that identifies failure-inducing patterns. Some of the challenges
are: (i) similar message sequences may end up with different outcomes as there
is a successful recovery in one of the sequence, (ii) two sequences may be similar
in terms of the set of messages output but follow different temporal patterns.An
overview of the steps taken to solve these challenges is shown in Figure 4.1.
The methodology consists of 3 main steps: (i) the first step is to transform
the log data into a suitable format for data analysis, (ii) the second step purges
redundant log messages to enable efficient analysis and (iii) the final step de-
tects failure-inducing patterns through an unsupervised learning approach. An
example of redundant event logs is seen in the sample event sequence shown in
Figure 3.2. It contain messages (e.g., log events 1 and 2 or log events 7 and
8) that can be classified as redundant. Such redundant messages only distort
failure patterns [117]. Hence, logs need to be preprocessed to remove the redun-
dant events while keeping the relevant ones. Finally, we apply an unsupervised
learning technique can be used to detect errors in the log files. We detail each
step in the next few sections.
3Observe that we do label the data with id information for the first requirement. We label
the data only to keep the runtime low and do not add labels that require expert knowledge.
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Figure 4.1: Methodology Work flow showing the steps taken to achieve the
objectives
4.3 Preprocessing
This section detail our approach for filtering redundant logs and the normal
approaches usually done for filtering. It first explains the general preprocessing
steps done in log analysis.
4.3.1 Log Events Preprocessing
We detail the steps that are most important in processing the log files into a
format suitable for analysis.
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Tokenization and Parsing
This phase involves parsing the logs to obtain the event types and event at-
tributes, using simple rules. Tokens that carry no useful information for analy-
sis are removed. For example, numeric-only tokens are removed but attributes
(alpha-numeric tokens) and the message types (English-like only terms) are
kept. Also, fields like protocol identifier and application are removed or omitted
during the parsing and tokenizing phase.
The message part contains English words, numeric and alphanumeric tokens.
The English tokens provide information pertaining to the state of the system
and contribute to meaningful patterns. The alphanumeric tokens capture the
interacting components or software functions involved. These interacting com-
ponents, which do not occur frequently and show less or no pattern, are also
important since we are interested in interacting nodes of the cluster system. On
the other hand, the numeric only tokens are removed as they only add noise.
Time Conversion
An event in a cluster system is logged with the time at which the event occurred.
The timestamps are very useful for any meaningful log analysis or time series
analysis. However, the time format reported is not readily suitable for manip-
ulation purposes, e.g. matrix manipulation. In the Ranger logs, for example,
a reported timestamp 2010 Mar 31 15:56:57 is for an event that occurred at
15th hour, 56th minute and 57th second on March 31, 2010. We then convert
this to the epoch timestamp format which gives a value of 1270051017 for the
above timestamp, which can then be easily manipulated. The Unix epoch (or
Unix time or POSIX time or Unix timestamp) is the number of seconds that
have elapsed since January 1, 1970 (midnight UTC/GMT)
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4.3.2 Log Compression: Removing Redundant Events
This section explains our log compression or filtering approach, where redundant
log events are removed. In the first step, we process the events such that similar
events are assigned the same unique id. Then, we remove those ids that are not
relevant in the sequence.
Obtaining Unique Events
One way of developing a technique with low runtime is to reduce the amount
of data to be analyzed, whilst keeping the relevant ones. Our proposed way of
achieving this is to develop an approach whereby events that are very similar to
each other or deemed identical are assigned the same id and, hence, redundant
events are then purged from the log file.
There are sets of events whose messages may be syntactically different (resp.
similar) but semantically similar (resp. different), making it challenging to
accurately capture the similarity of messages. However, the intuition that is used
here to support the identification of similar messages (with similar meaning) is
as follows: if two sentences (i.e. word sequences) are very closely related in
the order of the words, then it is very likely that they will have very similar
meaning. Thus, to identify similar events, we first extract the log messages of
the events, we then define an appropriate distance metric between two messages
to capture their similarity based on the word sequence. We also require the
notion of distance threshold to bound the distance between two messages that
are considered similar. We use the Levenshtein distance as a metric of sequence
similarity.
Levenshtein Distance (or Edit distance): We make use of Levenshtein
Distance (LD) [85] metric to capture the between two messages, LD is equally
defined on pairs of strings based on edit operations (i.e., insertion, deletion or
substitutions) on the characters of the strings. Hence, the Levenshtein distance
between two strings s1 and s2 is the number of operations required to transform
s2 into s1 or vice versa, as it is symmetric, assuming all operations count the
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same. LD is an effective and widely used string comparison approach. Since
we have messages, we extend LD to words and define it as follows: It is defined
based on edit operations (i.e. insertion, deletion or substitutions) on the words
of the messages. LD is found to be more suitable here than cosine similarity
metric, since the latter is a vector-based similarity measure.
From the sample logs of Figure 3.2, it can be observed that it is necessary for
any similarity metric used to consider the order of the terms in the log messages
to obtain a meaningful result. For example, the log messages ...error occurred
while communicating with... and ...Communication error occurred on... may
appear similar but may be semantically different. A similarity metric that does
not take order of terms into consideration (i.e., a metric considering a sentence
as a set of words) will cluster these events together, i.e., these events will be
seen as similar, because they have similar terms. To address this challenge,
we use the Levenshtein distance on terms, without transposition, taking term
order into consideration. Also, defining this metric based on terms reduces
the computational cost incurred, as opposed to when it is defined on string
characters.
We thus propose an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) that uses LD to first find
the similarity between log messages and then group similar events based on
similarity value. Then, events in the same cluster are indexed with the same id.
Finally, to bound the similarity of events, we define a similarity threshold,
with the lesser the number of edits, the higher the similarity. Hence, we define
the threshold such that, when the edit distance between a pair of messages is
less than or equal to the threshold, λ, (hence highly similar), these events are
regarded as similar and hence clustered together.
Event Similarity Threshold: As argued previously, two different messages
are likely to have a similar meaning if they differ in very few places only. Using
an iterative approach [61], we start with a small value of similarity threshold,
λ, then increase the value in small increments and monitor the output, until
a satisfactory similarity value is obtained using the log data. At this point,
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we observed that similar events are indeed grouped together. For a very small
similarity threshold (i.e., 0 or 1), only messages that are exactly similar are
clustered together. At the other end of the spectrum, a high value of λ will
result in messages with different meanings (and structure) to be grouped as
similar. After using an incremental technique, a threshold of 2 was chosen, i.e,
λ = 2.
We now propose an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that groups together similar
messages, according to the LD distance, and labels them with the same id. The
algorithm proceeds as follows: In the first step, it groups together messages with
the same number of tokens, i.e., messages of the same length. This is because
event messages with same token length are more likely to have been produced
by same printf statement or from same node and reporting similar happening.
Another reason is that we are not looking at the semantic meaning of the event
messages (which will involve natural language processing techniques), but the
events that similar in terms what produces them. Subsequently, the following
step goes through each group and partitions them into smaller groups based on
LD. An example of the output of Algorithm 1 is shown in Figure 4.2.
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for grouping similar events
1: procedure GroupSimilarEvents(log events e1, ..., en, Min Similarity
Threshold, λ)
2: for all log events ei, i = 1 . . . n do
3: group events based on their token length
4: end for
5: for each group g do
6: for each pair of message (mi,mj) in g do
7: if LD(mi,mj) <= λ then
8: group mi and mj together
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: assign a unique id to each group
13: Return() {outputs log events with their cluster ID}
14: end procedure
These logs still contain redundant events, for example, events 5 & 6 (please
observe that events 5 and 6 are clustered together, though being slightly dif-
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 Event ID Time-stamp Node 
Identifier 
Message 
1 LEO 1269856844 i128-401 LustreError:  error occurred while communicating with  
129.114.97.36@o2ib. The ost_write operation failed with  
2 LEO 1269856853 i128-401 LustreError:  error occurred while communicating with  
129.114.97.36@o2ib. The ost_write operation failed with  
3 SEGF 1269862036 i182-211 segfault at rip rsp  error 
4 SEGF 1269862036 i115-209 segfault at rip rsp  error 
5 SSL 1269943344 i107-308 BUG: Spurious soft lockup detected on CPU, pid:4242,  
uid:0, comm:ldlm_bl_22  
6 SSL 1269943344 i107-308 BUG: soft lockup detected on CPU, pid:21851, uid:0,  
comm:ldlm_bl_13  
7 MCE 1269943765 i107-111 Machine check events logged 
8 MCE 1269943791 i124-402 Machine check events logged 
9 CQF 1269943822 master client quota ctl  ptlrpc queue wait failed,  
10 MCE 1270099434 i181-409 Machine check events logged 
11 GBE 1270099438 visbig general bus error: participating processor local node 
response, time-out no timeout  memory transaction type  
generic read, mem or  io mem access  cache level generic 
 
Figure 4.2: Sample pre-processed logs of Figure 3.2
ferent, and are indexed using the same id). This necessitated next section
(removing redundant events).
Removing Redundant Events
According to Iyer and Rosetti [68], the occurrence of similar or identical events
within a small time window is likely caused by the same error, thus, these
messages are potentially related as they could point to the same root-cause.
This means that not all of these events are needed during analysis since they
are redundant. Therefore, removing these redundant messages may prove to be
beneficial to the analysis stage. In filtering of redundant log events, we consider
events in a sequence having the following properties:
• Similar events that are reported in sequence by the same node within a
small time window are redundant. This is because nodes can log several
similar messages that are triggered by the same fault, e.g., events 5 and 6
of Figure 4.2.
• Similar events that are reported by different nodes in a sequence and
within a defined time window are redundant. This could be triggered by
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the same fault resulting in similar mis-behaviour by those affected cluster
nodes.
• Identical events occurring in sequence (consecutively) and within a defined
small time window are redundant.
Normal filtering will keep the first event in a sequence of similar events and
remove the rest [154]. It is pertinent to note that it is also possible for error
messages logged by different nodes within close time intervals to be caused by
different faults, while some events are causally-related (emanate as a result of
the same fault). In this work we do not discard such events. The process of
identifying and grouping the error events exhibiting the above properties is done
using a combination of both tupling and time grouping heuristics [61]. We define
some heuristics that capture the properties outlined above.
Normal Filtering
Filtering or compression is a process used to reduce the complexities associated
with log analysis. It is generally agreed that filtering or pre-processing logs is an
important process [88, 154]. The process eliminates redundant events from logs,
thereby reducing the initial huge size of the logs. This however, must avoid the
purging of useful events or event patterns that are important for failure pattern
detection. In normal log filtering [88], events that repeats within certain time
window are removed, only the first event is kept. This simple log filtering we
refer to here as normal filtering. Normal filtering however, can remove fault
events that are relevant for analyzing causal correlations among events. On the
other hand, Zheng et al. [154] proposed an approach that can filter causally-
related events or what they termed as semantic redundancy. Their approach can
preserve useful patterns and has been shown to be better than normal filtering.
However, their approach is log-specific. It is dependent on the fact that logs must
be labelled with severity information. The approach would not work on logs
without severity information and hence cannot be generalized as most logs are
not pre-labelled with severity information. As a matter of contrast, we propose
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an approach that workS on any log with or without severity information.
Job-id based Filtering
With careful observation of the logs and through experts’ input, we realised
that achieving a high compression rate while preserving patterns is important
and dependent on how informative a given log is. For example, Ranger’s Ratlogs
events are labelled with more information regarding the nodes and jobs involved,
providing a richer description of an event. The Job-id field in logs indicates a
particular job that detects the reported event. The job-ids, when correlated with
failure events, tell us which jobs are the likely source of the failure. This implies
that identical job-ids present in different events within the same sequence would
likely have high correlation with the failure that is eventually experienced [24].
In order to achieve high event compression accuracy (ability to keep unique
events) and completeness (remove redundant events), we propose a filtering
approach that removes redundant events or events that are related based on
sources, similarity and time of occurrence.
Specifically, given two events e1 and e2, with times of occurrence Te1 and
Te2 respectively, these are causally-related or emanate as a result of the same
faults, and are hence redundant, if:
• nodeid(e1) == nodeid(e2) && jobid(e1) == jobid(e2) && |Te1 − Te2|
≤ tw && sim(e1, e2) ≥ λ,
where sim(.) is the similarity given by LD, λ is the similarity threshold, tw
is the time window for which events e1 and e2 are similar and can be filtered.
Table 4.3 depicts a sample filtered logs with redundant events removed.
4.4 Data Transformation
This involves translating the processed (filtered) data into a format that can
capture sequences of events into a matrix that can be readily used by any
analysis algorithm.
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Event ID Time-stamp Node 
Identifier 
Message 
LEO 1269856844 i128-401 LustreError:  error occurred while communicating with  
129.114.97.36@o2ib. The ost_write operation failed with  
SEGF 1269862036 i182-211 segfault at rip rsp  error 
SSL 1269943344 i107-308 BUG: Spurious soft lockup detected on CPU, pid:4242,  
uid:0, comm:ldlm_bl_22  
MCE 1269943765 i107-111 Machine check events logged 
CQF 1269943822 master client quota ctl  ptlrpc queue wait failed,  
MCE 1270099434 i181-409 Machine check events logged 
GBE 1270099438 visbig general bus error: participating processor local node 
response, time-out no timeout  memory transaction type  
generic read, mem or  io mem access  cache level generic 
 
Figure 4.3: Sample preprocessed event logs (syslog) with redundant event re-
moved
Event Sequences
Consider the sequence of events e1, e2, . . . , en in Figure 4.4. Assuming that
events ek, ek+j are failure events; we define the time window, tw for failure ek+j
as the period between events at times, say, `−τ and `, where the event at time `
is the failure event (ek+j) under consideration and time `− τ < τ < `, is time of
an event which occurs before the failure event at time `, which is event e3. The
sets of events within this period make the failure episode [24], where an event
sequence or pattern can be a subset of the failure pattern. So failure sequence
Fj includes all events up to that point, at time `.
 
e1 e2 e3 . . . ek ek+1 . . . ek+j . . . en 
Fi  
time 
Fj  
Time window  
Figure 4.4: Event logs sequence
Feature Creation
Events within sequences are believed to generate empirical probability distri-
bution implying relative probability of occurrence of each event within a se-
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K =

F1t1 F2t1 . . . FN t1
F1t2
.
.
.
F1tM F2tM . . . FN tM

Figure 4.5: Data matrix K of N sequences, where Fjti is the number of counts
of message term ti in sequence Fj .
quence [26]. In other words, the frequency of message types captures events
distribution or observation and its changes within patterns. This informed our
decision to utilise the message term-frequency transformation. More specifi-
cally, the messages from each sequence are transformed into a term - frequency
matrix (see Figure 4.5). The rows of the matrix represents the different terms
while the columns are the sequences. A failure sequence consists of events that
precede the failure event within a given time window.
Hence, given N sequences extracted within a time window, then the matrix
K, for this will contain M rows of message terms and N columns of sequences,
as shown in the matrix of Figure 4.5.
Matrix Normalization: The term weights or cumulative frequency across
sequences are normalized to a value within 0 and 1. This enables easy handling
and interpretation of the data and reduce sensitivity towards high variance data.
The frequencies are normalised by the formula in Equation 4.1.
nt(i) =
wt(Fi)
N∑
j=1
wt(Fj)
(4.1)
where nt is the normalized message term, wt(Fi) is the count of message term
t of sequence Fi. It is divided by the sum of the count of term t across all
sequences; hence, each column forms a probability distribution. For the sake
of simplicity, we represent these column vectors ( or sequences) as F1, ..., FN
subsequently in our clustering algorithm and the columns are the inputs.
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4.5 Sequence Clustering and Detection
4.5.1 Clustering
Given a setK = [Fi . . . FN ], ofN input entries (columns), where Fi = {Fit1, Fit2, ..., FitM},
then each input is either a normal event pattern or faulty one. Groups of se-
quences or patterns that exhibit similar characteristics due to the presence of
similar faults generating similar message types within a sequence or pattern can
be identified through clustering. Hence, in order to group such similar sequences
we employ distance based clustering.
For the purpose of faulty sequence detection in event logs, it is important to
define a distance metric that could capture the informativeness of the sequence
and/or correlation patterns between the events. Two metrics are defined as
explained below.
• Jenson-Shannon Divergence (JSD) metric measures the divergence or sim-
ilarity between two or more probability distributions. Events of log data
are sometimes infrequent and spatial in distribution (can occur randomly
in different sequences). JSD has been shown to be effective in capturing
relationships among tokens of such distribution [97], hence we utilised it
in this work. Considering two distributions Fi, Fj (note that we have es-
tablished earlier, that the input vectors are probability distributions), JSD
shows how much information is lost when using one of Fi or Fj to approx-
imate the other.
Hence, given two sequences (in this case, the input column vectors), Fi, Fj ,
then JSD is defined by
JSD(Fi, Fj) =
1
2
KLD(Fi‖E) + 1
2
KLD(Fj‖E) (4.2)
where KLD is the Kullback Divergence [34] given as KLD(Fi‖Fj) =
M∑
k=1
tkFi log(
tkFi
tkFj
) and E =
Fi + Fj
2
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Hence, the similarity between Fi and Fj is given by:
sim(Fi, Fj) = |1− JSD(Fi, Fj)|. (4.3)
The values range between 0 and 1, with values closer to 0 implying more
dissimilar sequences and values close to 1 implying similar type of se-
quences.
• The second metric, Correlation Metric (Corr), is based on the correlation
between sequences. Given any two columns from matrix K, the correlation
distance between them is given below, where cov is the covariance and std
is the standard deviation.
cov(Fi, Fj) =
1
M
M∑
k=1
(Fi,k − Fi)(Fj,k − Fj) (4.4)
std(Fi) =
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
k=1
(Fi,k − Fi)2 (4.5)
where Fi =
1
M
M∑
k=1
Fi,k
sim(Fi, Fj) = 1−
∣∣∣∣ cov(Fi, Fj)std(Fi) ∗ std(Fj)
∣∣∣∣ (4.6)
where Fi,k = tkFi is the value of the frequency of message term tk in sequence
Fi. We treat sim(.) as similarity or distance measure between two feature
vectors. Two clustering algorithms are proposed as explained below and seen
in Algorithms 2 and 3.
Na¨ıve Clustering Algorithm
Different faults may induce similar error manifestation in the system. There-
fore, in this algorithm, the basic assumption is that similar sequences are likely
to have been generated by the same fault type; therefore, all data points (se-
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quences) which are close enough based on a similarity metric are clustered to-
gether (Algorithm 2). The algorithm first initialised each data point (sequences)
as clusters such that all the sequences form sets of clusters. In that case, a copy
of the the set of clusters C is created. All the clusters with high similarity
values, sm (greater or equal to threshold), are considered to contain similar
pattern and hence group together. However, those patterns different from all
others are keep alone as singleton clusters. The result of this algorithm is a set
of clusters of similar patterns.
Algorithm 2 Na¨ıve clustering of event sequences
1: procedure Na¨ıveClustering(event sequences K = F1, F2, ..., FN , Simi-
larityThreshold, δ)
2: Initialize each Fi as a cluster of its own, all belonging to cluster set C;
Set of clusters C is the output.
3: for each Fi ∈ K do
4: for each cluster ck ∈ C do
5: for all members, Vj ∈ ck do
6: sm = sim(Fi, Vj);
7: if sm >= δ then
8: add Fi to cluster ck
9: else
10: if (last cluster) then
11: create a new cluster, c = Fi
12: add c to C
13: end if
14: end if
15: if Vj = last cluster point of ck then
16: add ck to C
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: end for
21: Repeat step 3 Until all sequences are clustered
22: Return() {outputs C, clusters containing event sequences}
23: end procedure
Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering Variant
The motivation for this algorithm stems from the fact that time at which a
fault is experience may affect the nature of the events despite the fact that the
sequences may have similar faults and secondly, sequences have a high tendency
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of belonging to more than one cluster, that is, patterns can be similar due
to the fact that similar computers executing similar jobs are likely to produce
similar messages [106]. In order to obtain more cohesive clusters of sequences,
we introduce a variant on hierarchical clustering, which we refer to as HAC. The
HAC algorithm (Algorithm 3) targets those sequences we refer to as borderline
sequences (sequences with the possibility to belong to more than one cluster),
so they are clustered in the right group in order to obtain the different sequence
characteristics for detection. These are sequences with the tendency to belong
to more than a cluster due to the presence of similar error messages. In HAC,
such “borderline” sequences are captured as sub-clusters of cluster with higher
closeness value. A cluster SC is a sub-cluster of cluster C, if |SC| < |C|, and
if the validity index of C, (val ind(C)), is greater than that of SC and the
similarity between their centroids is greater than or equal to the threshold,
δ. The Validity index [58], referred to in our algorithm as (val ind(C)), is
a measure of goodness of cluster C by finding the compactness or how close
elements of the cluster are and how separate it is from other clusters. We
calculated this using the Silhouette coefficient [58], given by equation 4.7.
si =
bi − ai
max(ai, bi)
(4.7)
where si = silhouette coefficient for sequence i, bi = minimum(average distances
of sequence i with sequences of other clusters), ai = average distance of i to
sequences in its own cluster. Hence, the goodness of the cluster is the average of
all the silhouettes, si, of the clusters; and −1 ≤ si ≤ 1, with value of si close to
1 indicating that the sequences clustered together are similar and values closer
to -1 indicating less similar sequences.
4.5.2 Detection of Failure Patterns
The aim of clustering is to group similar sequences or patterns together, which
are either normal or failure-inducing. It is hypothesized that similar sequences
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Algorithm 3 Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering (HAC) algorithm for event
sequences
1: procedure HAC(ci ∈ C, clusters of event sequences, SimilarityThreshold,
δ)
2: SC= sub-clusters
3: Sort C according to cluster size
4: for i← 0 to |C| − 1 do
5: for j ← i+ 1 to |C| do
6: Find similarity, sim, of centroids of clusters ci and cj ;
7: if sim >= δ then
8: if val ind(cj) > val ind(ci) then
9: add cj to set of potential sub-clusters, si of ci.
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: for all potential sub-cluster si do
14: add si to SC if not previously a sub cluster or if its sim is greater
than its previous sim value.
15: end for
16: end for
17: Return(SC) {}
18: end procedure
leading to failure will be clustered together and that the same holds for good
sequences. Event log sequences can be classified as noisy, periodic or silent
in their behaviour [43]. Noisy sequences occur with high frequency (bursty or
chatty) and the level of interaction of the nodes involved increases within short
period. The high level of interaction may depend on the type of faults that
has occurred. For example, communication errors generally result in spurious
event reporting by the nodes involved. Gainaru et al. [43] have shown that such
events are often symptoms that precede a failure. Normal sequences, on the
other hand, are mostly periodic. In this case, the sequences are characterised
by normal cluster status reports and moderately low interaction of components
over a longer time window.
In our approach, we harness these properties in order to characterise failure
sequences. We consider the measure of information of the sequences in clusters
and also how informative the message terms of the sequences are. These scenar-
ios can be captured by the Mutual Information (I) of sequences and Entropy
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(H) of message types. Both I and H are concepts that captures the informative-
ness of a given random variable. In our context,I captures common behaviour of
the interacting nodes within a sequence while H on the other hand, captures the
uncertainty or unpredictability of the event types within a sequence. To further
support our approach, it has been argued that changes observed in entropy are
good indicators of changes in the behaviour of distributed systems and networks
[79]. Our idea is motivated by Brown’s clustering algorithm [13], Percy Liang’s
work on terms cluster characteristics and quality [88] and log entropy [10]. We
hypothesize that sequences with higher uncertainty (entropy) and reduced I sig-
nifies abnormal system behaviour and failure sequences with the converse true
for normal systems behaviour.
Hence, given a set C of m clusters c1, ..., cm and ck = {F1, ..., FN}, containing
set of similar event sequences, then, Mutual Information I(ck) is given as:
I(ck) =
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
p(Fi, Fj) log
p(Fi, Fj)
p(Fi)p(Fj)
(4.8)
where p(Fi, Fj) is the joint probability distribution of sequences of cluster c,
p(F ) is the probability distribution of sequence F . Similarly, the Entropy (H),
is given as:
H(ck) = −
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Fitj logFitj (4.9)
where Fitj is the distribution of the terms tj of sequences Fi in a cluster ck.
We obtain the informativeness of a cluster c as:
ϕ(c) = I(c)−H(c) (4.10)
Hence, from Equations 5.4,5.5 and 4.10, detection is achieved as follows:
f(c) =

1 if ϕ(c) < 0
else

1 if ϕ(c) > τ & H(c) > 0
0 otherwise
(4.11)
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cluster f(c) is detected as containing failure sequences if its value of informative-
ness is high or not(depending on threshold) as shown in equation 4.11. Where
τ is detection threshold, the value of ϕ(c) for which we can decide if c contained
failure sequences or not.
Threshold Determination: Obtaining appropriate detection threshold, τ is
important for good result. We treat this as minimization of average percentage
error (APE) of miss-detection of failure sequences as seen in Equation 4.12.
APE =
md+ fp
ns
(4.12)
where md is the number of failure detected as non-failure (miss-detection), fp is
the number non-failure detected as failure(false positive), ns is the total number
of sequences. Our decision space is constrained by setting the threshold values
within [0.1 0.9] (this is because we earlier have normalise our data to values
within 0 and 1 ). The value with the minimum APE is chosen as our τ . Defer-
ential Evolution (DE) is an approach that is well-studied in other fields [28] and
can be used to obtain good detection threshold. However, our decision space is
too small to warrant such computationally expensive approach.
4.6 Experiment
The aim of our methodology is to detect patterns that eventually lead to failure.
We evaluate the methodology on logs from productions systems. This section
explains how we performed the experiments on the logs of two production sys-
tems. These are: (1) Syslogs (2) Rationalized logs (Ratlogs), both from Ranger
supercomputer logs from Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) at the
University of Texas, Austin4 and (3) the logs from IBM Blue Gene/L super-
computer is available on the USENIX repository5. A summary of the logs used
is shown in Table 3.1. We refer our reader to [24], [60] for more details about
4www.tacc.utexas.edu
5www.usenix.org/cfdr
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Ranger supercomputer logs and [88] for the Blue Gene/L logs.
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
Failure as well as non-failure patterns from the three system logs are used for
testing the methodology. These patterns are obtained after careful consideration
of the time between consecutive failures by the experts. In considering the failure
data, overlapping failure patterns is avoided. In doing so, the time between two
non-overlapping failures events tfei and tfej must satisfy: αt ≤ |tfei − tfej
∣∣ ≤
tw, where αt is a small time between two failure events fei and fej , for which
they can be regarded as similar and tw is the time window considered. For
example, two nodes may suffer the same correlated failure, only one of such
event is considered. Similarly, we obtained non-failure or good sequences.
A maximum time window, tw, of 120 minutes is considered for our experi-
ment, i.e., events that occur within 120 minutes of a failure forms a sequence.
We also observe patterns at times (20, 40, 60, 80, 100) in our experiment, with
the failure occurring at time .
The choice of 120 minutes time window stems from an established work [25],
[59] and the system’s administrators advice, they established that the mini-
mum mean time to failure of failure correlated events(Ranger supercomputer)
is around 2 hours or more. In order to avoid the probability of overlapping
failure runs, we chose the 120 minutes time window. This also is helpful in
establishing that detection can be done within a short time period.
The summary of the sequences/patterns is seen in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary of sequences/patterns obtained from the three production
system’s logs
Logs/Pattern Faulty Non-Faulty Total
Syslogs 101 207 308
Ratlogs 93 212 305
BGL 42 78 120
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4.6.2 Evaluation Metrics
Our goal is to be able to identify sequences or patterns in event logs that are
failure-inducing. That is, given patterns, we could separate failure-inducing
patterns from non-failure patterns. To measure performance of our detection
algorithm, we employ the widely used performance measures in Information
Retrieval (IR) namely, Precision, Recall and F-measure metrics. Precision is
the relative number of correctly detected failure sequence/patterns to the total
number of detections, Recall is the relative number of correctly detected failure
sequences to the total number of failure sequences and F-measure is the har-
monic mean of precision and recall as expressed in Equations 4.13, 4.14 and
5.10 respectively. We capture the parameters in the metrics as follows and as
seen in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Evaluation metrics
• True positives (TP): Number of failure sequences correctly detected.
• False positives (FP): Number of non-failure (good) sequences detected as
failure.
• False negatives (FN): Number of failure sequences identified as non-failure
sequences.
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Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4.13)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4.14)
F −Measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
(4.15)
A good detection approach or mechanism should provide a high value for
the metrics above. A recall value of 1.0 meaning that the approach can detect
every single fault pattern and value of 0 implying the approach is useless as it
cannot detect any failure-inducing pattern.
4.6.3 Parameter Setting
The choice of parameter values largely affects the result of any experiment
as it is challenging to navigate the large solution space. Likewise, choosing
optimal parameter values is practically difficult. We employ experimentation
to determine suitable values for our parameters. The thresholds used at the
filtering, clustering and detection steps are chosen based on experimenting with
several values and choosing the best options. Table 4.3 show a cluster with
two sequences/patterns (Seq. 1 and Seq. 2). These patterns are very similar
(sim=0.83 ), and are detected as failure sequences. Careful manual observation
shows that seq. 2 is not a failure pattern as it eventually experiences successful
recovery with no failure event (hence it is a FP), unlike seq. 1, which ended in
failure (soft lockup).
Na¨ıve Clustering was able to obtain good clusters which represents similar
sequences leading to failures as seen from Figure 4.7. This figure shows the
validity index (goodness) of the clustering (i.e., how closely related are the
sequences). However, with careful consideration of the clusters, we observed that
the same sets of events are captured in different clusters due to the frequency
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of occurrence of the events. The inter-cluster similarities of these sequences are
however not low, averaging around 0.55. This implies that the tendencies for
similar failure sequences to be in different clusters is high, necessitating HAC.
This is observed more in both Ratlogs and Syslogs. BGL sequences tend to
behave differently with fewer events forming sequence.
The silhouette values obtained for HAC algorithm is slightly lower than the
Na¨ıve clustering for the first 100 minutes time windows. In Na¨ıve clustering,
only sequences where faults occur at close time interval are clustered together
and excludes fault sequences with smaller lead time to failure. On the other
hand, with HAC, the temporal effect on sequences is reduced (i.e., patterns
are clustered together even when faults occur at different times). This will
eventually reduce the value of validity index. This scenario is not seen in BGL
because different temporal occurrence of faults that changes patterns is rarely
observed.
Table 4.2: Experiment Parameter Values
Threshold
Parameter
λ δ τ
Parameter Value 2 0.6 0.2
Hence, based on all these scenarios explained above, we adopt experimen-
tation on several possible parameters to enable us choose the best parameters
as seen in Table 4.2. For our filtering approach, few parameters were used;
the event’s similarity threshold λ = 2. This value was chosen as explained in
Section 4.3.2. The sequence clustering similarity threshold value, δ for both
Na¨ıve and HAC clustering is 0.6. At this similarity value, we obtained a better
validity index (goodness of cluster) for the clustering, see Figure 4.7. Detection
threshold, τ , the value for which we can decide if a sequence is a failure or not
was set to be τ = 0.2. This value is obtained by performing detection using
values within the range [0.1 0.9] while we observe the average percentage error
(APE) of miss-detection given by equation 4.12, Figure 4.8 shows that the low-
est APE is obtained at the detection threshold τ = 0.2, hence, this informed
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our choice.
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Figure 4.7: Cluster goodness based on intra-cluster and inter-cluster similarity
(on Syslog, JSD metric)
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Figure 4.8: APE (percentage miss-detection) vs Detection Threshold
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Table 4.3: Sample Clustering Result (syslog, HAC) for a cluster with sequences (seq.1 and seq.2)
Sim Sequence Events
Seq. 1
0.83
Machine check events logged
error occurred while communicating with,**@o2ib **
Connection service share OSTd via nid,** @o2ib ** was lost progress operations using this service
will wait for recovery complete
Skipped previous similar messages
error occurred while communicating with,**@o2ib **
OSTd UUID not available for connect stopping
Request sent from share OSTb NID,** @o2ib ** ago has timed out limit,
quota interface still havent managed acquire quota space from the quota master after retries err rc
Machine check events logged,
Connection service share OSTd via nid **@o2ib** was lost progress operations using this service
will wait for recovery complete
Recovery timed out **
BUG soft lockup detected CPU** pid uid comm ldlm bl
Seq. 2
Machine check events logged
Skipped previous similar messages
error occurred while communicating with,**@o2ib **
Connection service share OSTd via nid,**@o2ib ** was lost progress operations using this service
will wait for recovery complete
Machine check events logged
error occurred while communicating with,**@o2ib **
Connection restored service share OST using**
Recovery complete with **,
Machine check events logged
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4.7 Results
We show the results of the experiments conducted and we also discuss these
results in this section.
Filtering
We show from Figure 4.9, the rate of compression of logs under varying values of
LD threshold, λ. At λ = 2, The filtering approach obtained good compression
from original logs. It achieved compression of 78%, 80% and 84% on syslog,
ratlog and BGL logs respectively.
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Figure 4.9: Compression rates given varying LD on syslog
Normal filtering achieved an average compression of 88%, which is higher
than our method. Both normal filtering and Zheng et al. [154] approaches
obtain better compression rate because their methods was able to filter events
deemed similar within given time. Unlike theirs method, we believe that doing
so will remove important events that could serve as precursor or signatures to
failure. Hence we kept such causally-related but semantically unrelated events.
Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 demonstrates the result of performing detection
(using HAC, correlation distance) on logs filtered using the normal filtering and
our filtering method. The results show that our method achieved an average F-
79
4. Error Detection Using Clustering
measure of 77% while normal filtering achieved 48% on syslog. An improvement
of about 19% over the normal filtering is achieved on ratlog and 10% on BGL.
The implications of these results is that filtering based on our approach greatly
enhance failure patterns clarity by preserving useful failure precursor events.
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Our Method Normal Filtering Figure 4.10: Showing the F-measure detection of both our method and normal
filtering on syslog
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Figure 4.11: Showing the F-measure detection of both our method and normal
filtering on ratlog
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Figure 4.12: Showing the F-measure detection of both our method and normal
filtering on BGL
Filtered and Redundant Logs
Preprocessing, especially filtering redundant events in logs is not a compulsory
step in log analysis. However, it is necessary when there is need. It should not
reduce the effectiveness of the targeted analysis. To demonstrate the effective-
ness of our redundant event filtering for failure pattern detection, we conducted
experiments on both logs without redundant event removal and the filtered logs.
The result is as shown in Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15. It also contains using only
the ids as representative of events for detection.
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CCGrid Results. 
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Figure 4.13: Showing the F-measure detection on both filtered and redundant
logs (syslog)
CCGrid Results. 
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Figure 4.14: Showing the F-measure detection on both filtered and redundant
logs (ratlog)
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CCGrid Results. 
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Figure 4.15: Showing the F-measure detection on both filtered and redundant
logs (BGL)
Existing Detection approach
We conducted an experiment to evaluate how our method perform compared
to Xu et al. [147] approach. We choose this for comparison because it is a
well-established method in the field and related to our method.
In summary, Xu’s approach basically creates features from the console logs.
Feature vector is created base on the frequency of events, analogous to the con-
cept of Bag of Words (BoW) in information retrieval. Detection of fault events
is treated as anomaly detection of the feature vectors which are labelled as faulty
or non-faulty. Their approach further uses principal component analysis (PCA)
to perform anomaly detection or subsequent detection of faults. Compared to
our approach, we created feature vectors which form inputs to our algorithm
the same way. However, the features we used are event types in sequence. we
performed detection differently, we do not employ PCA, and we developed an
algorithm that utilises the entropy and mutual information of the sequences to
detect failure features. Each sequence which is a features is labelled as faulty
or non-faulty. We do not detect individual messages, rather, we detect group
of messages that form sequence which are symptomatic to failure. This neces-
sitated the idea of clustering in our algorithm. We explain the results for both
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methods in next section.
Pattern Detection Results
The results we present here compares our approach to detecting failure patterns
in logs with an existing approach we called Xu.
The legends of the graphs in Figures 4.16, 4.17, 4.19,4.20, 4.22 and 4.23 indi-
cates: clustering algorithm and distance metric used. For example, HAC.Corr
implies HAC algorithm with Correlation distance.
Syslog: The performance of the approach when applied on syslog was good.
A high detection is achieved across all the time windows as seen in the values
of recall and precision in Figures 4.16 and 4.17 respectively. Particularly using
HAC.Corr achieved a recall of more than 90% across all time windows. This
implies that on syslog data, irrespective of the time window used for detection,
our approach can achieve high detection. Meanwhile, Xu’s method achieved
low performance seen in the F-measure values (Figure 4.18); it only improve at
higher time window (120 minutes). However, our approach performed consis-
tently better across all the time windows used. Looking at the two clustering
approaches used, the performance using both HAC and Naive clustering are con-
sistently high, (see Figures 4.16 and 4.17), with average precision of 65% and
recall of 88%. Using correlation distance metric (Corr), it performed slightly
better than using JSD as time tends towards failure (see Figure 4.18). This
implies that detection of failure sequence is most effective using our method
when correlation between interacting components of system is high.
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Figure 4.16: The Precision of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on syslog
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Figure 4.17: The Recall of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method on
syslog
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Figure 4.18: The F-measure of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on syslog data
Ratlog: Performance of our method on ratlog is very good compared to Xu’s
method as can been seen in the precision and the recall values of Figures 4.19 and
4.20. We obtained up to 79% precision with the use of correlation distance and
recall above 90% for HAC.Corr. Naive clustering approach performed poorly
at lower time windows. Effectively, from Figure 4.21, the result demonstrates
that F-measure is high for our method for all the time windows. On the other
hand, Xu’s approach achieved its best F-measure at higher time window of
120 minutes. Our method achieved better F-measure because the logs contains
better event information characterizing faults and the lead time to failure is
small, implying many different faults patterns could be experienced late towards
failure.
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Figure 4.19: The Precision of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on ratlog
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Figure 4.20: The Recall of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method on
ratlog
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Figure 4.21: The F-measure of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on ratlog
BGL Results on BGL logs seen in Figures 4.22 and 4.23, compared to other
two logs, is relatively inconsistent in its detection performance across all the
time widows used. However, the performance of our method is better than Xu’s
approach. It achieved an average recall and precision improvement over Xu’s
method by about 15% and 22% respectively. This is equally reflected in the
F-measure values seen in Figure 4.24. Based on our investigation, we observed
that BGL logs rarely reports fault within short time window and where there
are some failure events, there could be no or few preceding precursor events that
can be observed. This could be the reason for relatively inconsistent detection
performance. A more longer time window could show better result.
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Figure 4.22: The Precision of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on BGL
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Figure 4.23: The Recall of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method on
BGL
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Figure 4.24: The F-measure of our failure pattern detection and Xu’s method
on BGL
4.7.1 Runtime Analysis
The execution time of detection algorithm is small across all the time windows
(highest about 33 seconds) as seen in Figure 4.25. It scales increases with
increase in log size and time window. This is good, and detection is achieved in
good time. Obviously, the execution time is dependent on the size of logs and
the larger the time window, the bigger the size of logs.
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Figure 4.25: The runtime graph of Detection approach
90
4. Error Detection Using Clustering
4.8 Summary
The contributions of this chapter are as follows: Firstly, we enable failure pre-
diction on the basis of observed patterns collected in an unsupervised manner.
Secondly, the high computational cost associated with recovery is only incurred
when there is an impending failure. We first filter event logs based on their
similarities, in order to preserve patterns deemed useful or are most indicative
of as a precursor to failures. Subsequently, using the filtered logs, we develop
an unsupervised approach that leverages fault characteristics to detect patterns
leading to a failure among runs of event logs.
Technically, We proffer a log-analysis methodology that first filters the log
files and subsequently propose an error detection methods based on pattern
similarity. We apply our approach on log files obtained from the Ranger super-
computer and the IBM BlueGene/L and obtained a F-measure on detection.
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CHAPTER 5
Improving Error Detection Using Resource Usage Data and
Event Logs
5.1 Introduction
A number of works [9, 43, 53, 112, 147] have shown that detecting fault occur-
rences (i.e., errors) using logs and other data has received good attention, with
reasonably good results as seen in the literature review. The challenge is that,
even though the earlier mentioned attempts reported good detection results,
they are constrained mainly to failures which are remarkably characterised by
frequent reporting of events, as seen in Figure 5.1. However, this is not the
case for some types of failures experienced in HPC systems. For example, some
failures caused by soft errors may not produce visible and abnormally frequent
events that would signify a faulty behaviour. More so, some faults can induce
a silent behaviour (i.e., events are sparse) and only become evident when the
failure is about to occur (see Figure 5.2). In such a case, this provides a small
mean time to failure in the sense that the time between the error detection and
the actual failure is small. In these cases, approaches based on entropy and
mutual information, as mentioned above, will not help.
In general, the event logs provides insufficient information regarding the
behaviour of HPC systems that can be used to accurately detect errors in the
system. To circumvent the problem induced by the incompleteness issue of event
logs, we complement these logs with resource usage data in this study. In short,
resource usage data captures the amount of resources consumed or produced by
all the jobs in the system. For example, the resource usage data file may contain
the amount of memory a job is using at a given time as well as the number of
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Figure 5.1: Bursty faulty event sequence showing the behaviour of fault events
logged within an hour
messages a job has output on the network. It has been generally argued that
unusually high or anomalous resource usage could lead to failure of systems [25].
Most supercomputer systems do not make such usage data available, making it
difficult for researchers to verify this.
To detect errors in the system, we propose a novel approach that uses both
event logs and resource usage logs. The use of resource usage data enables the
detection of anomalous jobs which, when coupled with the erroneous behaviour
of nodes (as captured from the event logs), will indicate the existence of an
error in the system. The resource utilization would provide us with better
understanding of the system’s behaviour in the face of few precursor events in
the event logs. The approach is unsupervised, meaning that neither the resource
usage data nor event logs carry labels. This is valuable and relevant for two
reasons: (i) when resource usage data is used, given that little work has been
done based on resource usage data, very little labelled data is available and (ii)
the ability to provide labelled data requires extensive and detailed knowledge
about the system, which may not always be available; additionally, the labelling
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Figure 5.2: Silent faulty event sequence showing the behaviour of fault events
logged within an hour
process is also time-consuming.
The objective of this chapter can be stated as follows: Given an event se-
quence and resource usage data, we seek to determine whether the event se-
quence contains error messages that indicate impending failure. We seek to find
an unsupervised approach to detecting patterns indicative of failure from both
event logs and the resource usage data of any HPC system.
5.2 Detection Methodology
We now briefly summarize our methodology. Firstly, event logs are reported as
stream of events occurring in time. However, to keep the log analysis tractable,
it is beneficial to break a long sequence into smaller sequences of similar size,
which we measure in time units (obtained from the timestamps). We thus call
the size of a small sequence the time window. The choice of the time window is
dependent on how informative events within such time window are, i.e., the time
window needs to be as small as possible but with enough informative events to
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characterise the time window. Given that event logs contain both normal and
error messages [43] and are generally incomplete, we seek to complement these
event logs with resource usage data to aid error detection. Here, our premise
is that abnormal resource usage is indicative of a fault having occurred in the
system,
Next we transform these data into a format that captures the system be-
haviour within the chosen time window and can be used easily by any detection
algorithm. We create a feature matrix from the event log and another from the
usage data; we then extract the Mutual Information and Entropy of the inter-
acting nodes and event types respectively. This is done after nodes with similar
behaviour are clustered together. We then determine “outlierness” of a sequence
by performing a PCA outlier detection on the resource utilisation data feature
matrix. This step provides us with an anomaly score of a sequence which is then
used in error detection. The detection process leverages the mutual information,
entropy and anomaly score of the sequence to determine whether the sequence
is likely to end in failure. This section focuses on detailing our methodology as
seen in Figure 5.3.
5.2.1 Data Transformation
Notations and Terminologies: Before explaining our methodology, we briefly
mention the notations used. We will denote a specific item using a small letter,
while we will use the associated capital letter to denote the total number of that
item. For example, we will denote a specific node by n (or ni) and the total
number of nodes in the system by N .
This section focuses on obtaining appropriate system data that can represent
nodes and running jobs behaviour. These behaviour inherently describes the
state of the system within a given time. The data (both event logs and resource
usage data) need to be transformed into a format suitable for analysis. In order
to detect abnormalities in resource usage, we extract the attributes/elements
which capture the state of the resources for each job on each node within given
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Figure 5.3: Methodology work flow showing steps taken to achieve detection
time. Generally, we extract features from event logs and then from resource
usage data.
Event logs Features
For event logs, we denote by eli the number of events el produced by node
ni within a given time window. Given E different possible events, we obtain a
vector [e1i . . . e
E
i ] which contains the number of occurrences of each event on node
ni. We call this vector an event feature of node ni. This concept is analogous to
the bag of words concept used in information retrieval, which has been proven
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to be effective in capturing relationships between terms/words/messages. We
reuse the same idea because the event log messages are our primary source of
data about the health of the systems. The features that are produced depend
on the frequency distribution of event logs. Hence, for a given time window tw,
each node will produce an event feature, resulting in a matrix, where each row
represents a event feature and each column represents the number of occurrences
of a given event by different nodes in the system.
For a given time window tw, we denote the resulting event feature matrix
by Ftw, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Ftw =

e11 e
2
1 . . . e
E
1
e12 . . . . .
.
.
.
e1N e
2
N . . . e
E
N

Figure 5.4: Data matrix Ftw of a sequence with N nodes and E event types,
where eli denotes the number of occurrences of event el by node ni.
Resource Usage Features
A system will typically have a number of counters that capture different aspects
of the system during execution. These counters indicate the amount of resources
they are associated with that are being produced or consumed. For example,
a memory counter may capture the amount of memory that is being used by a
given job at a given time. Denoting a given job by jk which executes on node
ni during time window tw, we denote the amount of a resource r used by jk
on ni during tw by U
r,w
k,i . We call the vector of resources used or produced by
a given job jk on node ni during time window tw as a resource feature and we
denote it by Uwk,i and is defined as U
w
k,i = [U
1,w
k,i , . . . U
R,w
k,i ]. Whenever the exact
location of a job is unimportant, we will denote the usage matrix by Uwk , i.e.,
Uwk denotes the different resources used or produced by job jk in time window
tw.
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Similar to event features, we construct a J ×R resource feature matrix1 for
a given time window tw, which we denote by U tw, where each row is a resource
feature of a job and each column is the vector that captures the amount of the
specific resource used or produced by all the jobs in the time window. Specif-
ically, the value associated with U tw[k, r] represents the amount of resource r
that has been used or produced by job jk during time window tw.
5.2.2 Event Clustering and Feature Extraction
Given the event features created from the event logs as depicted by the matrix of
Figure 5.4, we perform clustering to group nodes exhibiting similar behaviour.
The underlying reason for this is that, nodes executing similar jobs tend to log
similar events. This means that a component fault could get to be reported by
these nodes enabling us to capture node level behaviour of the systems through
clustering. Mutual Information and Entropy of the individual features clustered
are obtained.
Clustering
Makanju et.al., [94] has shown that the state of systems can be discovered
through information content clustering. As stated earlier, Oliner et al., [106]
verified the hypothesis that similar nodes correctly executing similar jobs should
produce similar logs. This implies that a fault in a node or job could cause a
cascading effect or alter communicating jobs, which could result in producing
similar fault events. This also means that we can leverage the homogeneity
of large scale systems to improve fault detection. To achieve this, we employ
clustering to group nodes with similar behaviour to be able to extract the group
behaviour.
Clustering groups similar data points together in such a way that those in
different group are very dissimilar. In this case, we group nodes with similar
behaviour in terms of the events they log within the given time window. Hence,
1 U can be used to denote usage matrix when the tw is not used for purpose of clarity
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given a sequence of events within a given time window, the event features which
are formed from the data transformation section is an N ×E matrix, Ftw, (see
Figure 5.4) with N being the number of nodes (rows) and E the number of
event types (columns). eli is the count of event types e
l produced by node ni.
We employ a simple centroid-based hierarchical clustering (see Algorithm 4) to
perform this. We employ this clustering approach because we assume there are
one or more outlier nodes within a sequence, and a centroid-based clustering as
this is not sensitive to outliers.
In any distance-based clustering, the distance metric is key to achieving a
good result. For our purpose, we defined a distance metric that could capture
the informativeness of each node within the sequence and/or the correlation
between the events types in the sequence. Hence we employ the Correlation
Metric as our clustering similarity distance metric.
Correlation Metric (Corr), is based on the correlation within nodes of the
sequence. Given two feature vectors of Ftw as xi, xj , then we compute the
similarity as follows:
cov(xi, xj) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
(xki − xi)(xkj − xj) (5.1)
std(xi) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
k=1
(xki − xi)2 (5.2)
where xi =
1
N
N∑
k=1
xki is the mean of vector xi; then,
sim(xi, xj) = 1−
∣∣∣∣ cov(xi, xj)std(xi) ∗ std(xj)
∣∣∣∣ . (5.3)
We treat sim(.) as a similarity or distance measure between two feature vectors.
The above distance metric must and is observed to satisfy the following
properties given two variables xi and xj :
1. Non-negativity property, that is, 0 ≤ 1− |sim(xi, xj)| ≤ 1.
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2. 1 − |sim(xi, xj)| = 0 if and only if xi and xj are linearly related or xi is
same as xj .
3. Symmetric: that is 1− |sim(xi, xj)| = 1− |sim(xj , xi)|.
4. Scalability: for some given constants c1, c2, c3, c4, if yi =
xi − c1
c3
and
yj =
xj − c2
c4
, then 1 − |sim(xi, xj)| = 1 − |sim(yi, yj)|. In essence, the
measure is invariant to scaling and variable translation.
Algorithm 4 An algorithm for clustering similar behaving nodes
1: procedure Clustering(C, λ)
2: Inputs: |C| event features with ci ∈ C, i = 1 . . . n; MinimumSimilari-
tyThreshold λ.
3: Initially assume each node vector as unique, with each as a cluster on
its own;
4: for i = 1 to |C| − 1 do
5: for j = i+ 1 to |C| do
6: sim = sim(ci, cj) . Find similarities of centroids of ci and cj
7: if (sim ≥ λ) then
8: Merge ci and cj ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: add the merged cluster to set of new clusters
12: end for
13: Repeat step 1 with new set of merged clusters until similarity less than
λ is achieved
14: Return new m sets of clusters of similar nodes
15: end procedure
Sequence Feature Extraction
The amount of information provided by the nodes within a given time window
and also the informativeness of the event types could provide useful hints on
unusual behaviour of such nodes within the time window. We assume that
these behaviours can be succinctly represented by these two features of the
sequence: Mutual Information (I) and Entropy (H) of event types produced by
each node within the given time window. To further support our approach, it
has been argued that changes in entropy are good indicators of changes in the
behaviour of distributed systems and networks [79]. This informed our decision
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to extract these event features. We assume that a higher uncertainty (entropy)
with reduced mutual information could signify abnormal system behaviour or a
failure sequence with the converse being true for normal behaviour.
Sequence Mutual Information (I)
Mutual Information measures the relationship between two random variables
especially when they are sampled together. Specifically, it measures how much
information a random variable ei (event feature) carries about another variable
ej . Essentially, it answers the question about the amount of information event
features ei and ej carry about each other. Hence, given cluster of event features
C = {c1, ..., cm} and ci = {e1, ..., en}, containing set of similar event features,
then,
I(ci) =
N−1∑
j=1
N∑
k=j+1
p(ej , ek) log
p(ej , ek)
p(ej)p(ek)
(5.4)
where p(ej , ek) is the joint distribution of event features of cluster ci, p(e) is
the marginal distribution of event feature e. Then. I(C) is given by: I(C) =
1
|C|
∑
ci∈C
I(ci). Nodes within a sequence characterised by frequent events log-
ging and probably similar events due to the same fault will have high mutual
information.
Sequence Entropy (H)
Entropy, on the other hand, is a measure of uncertainty of a random variable.
In other words, when the information content of event types of a sequence are
highly unpredictable, then the sequence has high entropy. For each event cluster
ci,we define entropy as follows:
H(ci) = −
∑
j
p(ej) log p(ej) (5.5)
where p(ej) is the distribution of event types of event features in ci. The entropy
of the sequence is then given by the average of the entropies of each cluster of
the sequence. The changes observed in entropy are usually good indicators of
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changes in the behaviour of the cluster system. Such changes may point to
imminent failure in the cluster system.
5.2.3 Jobs Anomaly Extraction from Resource Usage Data
In a cluster system, large amount of nodes are present with hundreds of jobs
running. The resource usage data contains statistics about the usage of resources
(e.g. CPU, I/O transfer rates, virtual memory utilization) of each of these
nodes by each job running in the cluster system within the given time. This
information provides useful hints regarding an unusual behaviour of a given job
in terms of its rate of resource utilization. Hence, the resource data transformed
into a matrix as explained in section 5.2.1 is used as our input data. Our aim
here is to obtain anomalous jobs which could significantly point to problem(s)
in the cluster system as observed by the anomalous jobs within a period. A
column vector of the matrix represents a job and a row represent a counter or
attributes (e.g. dirty pages hits, read bytes, tx msgs etc), see Table 3.2 for the
full list of counters.
There are a significant number of research work on approaches to detecting
anomalies (see Chapter 2). Since we do not have data labelled with how normal
behaviour of jobs should be, the wisest option is to use an unsupervised approach
to detect anomalous jobs. Principal component analysis (PCA), has been a
widely and efficiently used feature extraction method in different fields [84] and
also for identifying anomalous node behaviour [80]. We utilise this approach to
find anomalous jobs in resource usage data.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
In this section, we briefly explain PCA which would introduce us to how it is
utilized for anomaly detection purpose. PCA is a well known and researched
technique for dimensionality reduction. PCA basically determines the principal
direction of a given data points by constructing the covariance matrix of the data
and finding the dominant eigenvectors (principal directions). These eigenvectors
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are also seen as the most informative of the original data space. Let U =
[j1, j2, ..., jn]
T ∈ <n×k, where each row ji representing k − dimension data
instance of job, and n is the number of data instances or jobs, then PCA,
formulated as an optimization problem, first calculates the covariance matrix C
of U as:
C =
1
n
UUT . (5.6)
Then the eigenvalues, λi, (i = 1...p and p < k) are calculated and sorted
in decreasing order with the first being the highest eigenvalue. From this, a
projection matrix V = [a1, a2, ..., ap] consisting of p−dominant eigenvectors is
constructed, with each data point, x, projected into a new subspace as:
X = V TJ. (5.7)
The p-dominant eigenvectors produced are in decreasing order of dominance.
Anomalous Jobs Detection in Usage Logs Using PCA
This section seeks to look at utilizing PCA to identify anomalous jobs running
in cluster system within a given time window. We employ an approach with the
similar property of principal directions as the one made in [84]. The basis for
the approach is that, for every data point, removing or adding it contributes to
the behaviour of the most dominant direction. This is because PCA relies on
calculating mean and data covariance matrix in obtaining eigenvectors, and it is
observed to be sensitive to the presence of an outlier. Hence, in this approach,
the outlierness of a job can be determined by the variation in the dominant
principal direction. Specifically, by adding an outlier the direction of dominant
principal component changes, but a normal data point doesn’t change it.
Sequence Anomaly
The assumption here is that, any anomalous job will cause deviation from the
leading principal direction, therefore, a sequence anomaly or “outlierness” is
the average value of all the outlier or anomalous jobs present within such time
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window. For example, in Figure 5.5, the points in red are likely anomalous jobs.
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Figure 5.5: Jobs outlierness of a sequence using PCA
So, given data points U = [j1, j2, ..., jn]
T , the leading principal direction,
d, of matrix U is extracted. Then for each data point ji, obtain the leading
principal component, di, of U without data point ji. The outlierness, ai, of ji
is the dissimilarity of d and di. The algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Sequence anomaly score algorithm
1: procedure AnomalyScore(U, γ, ji)
2: d = Leading Principal direction of J
3: di = Leading Principal direction of J without data point ji.
4: a = 0 . initialise anomaly score
5: sim(di, d) =
di · d
‖di‖‖d‖
6: a = 1− |sim(di, d)|
7: if (a ≥ γ) then
8: return ai . returns anomaly score
9: else
10: return 0 . returns 0 for not anomalous
11: end if
12: end procedure
Any data point with “outlierness” greater than given threshold γ is regarded
as anomalous.
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5.2.4 Detection of Failure Patterns
The algorithm is aimed at detecting a sequence of events within a chosen time
window that most likely indicates the presence of errors. The algorithm leverage
the features that capture the behaviour of nodes within a sequence (i.e., mutual
information and entropy), where high values (i.e., above a threshold) of these
features indicate the presence of errors which would likely lead to a failure.
Together with a high I(si) and H(si), an anomalous sequence ai of resource
usage is a high indication of failure. Otherwise, we consider such a sequence to be
normal. The detection algorithm will then depend on our definition of anomaly,
as captured by the thresholds. We define thresholds for Mutual Information
(µ), Entropy (ϕ) and sequence anomaly,(γ). The algorithm can be seen in
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Sequence detection
1: procedure Detect(S, γ, µ, ϕ)
2: for each sequence si in S do
3: I(si) =Mutual Information(si)
4: H(si) = Entropy(si)
5: ai = AnomalyScore(S, γ, si) . from resource Usage data of sequence
6: fi = I(si)−H(si)
7: if (I(si) >= µ && H(si) >= ϕ && ai > 0) || (ai > 0 && H(si) >=
ϕ && fi <= 0) then
8: Return True . faulty Sequence
9: else
10: Return False . non-faulty or normal sequence
11: end if
12: end for
13: end procedure
In summary, the Algorithm 6 detects errors in a sequence based on I, H and
sequence anomaly score, ai.
5.2.5 Experiment and Results
We evaluate our approach through experiments conducted on Rationalized logs
(ratlogs) and resource usage data from the Ranger Supercomputer from the
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Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) at the University of Texas at Austin2.
The resource usage data were collected using TACC Stats [59] that takes
snapshots at the beginning of job execution, in ten-minute intervals and at the
end of the job execution. Jobs generate their resource usage data, which are
archived on the file system. The events are logged by each node through a
centralized message logging system. The logs are combined and interleaved in
time. We evaluate our approach on four weeks of resource usage data (32GB)
and rationalized logs (1.2GB). These data were collected for the month of March
2012. It is worth noting that within this time, the system experienced high
failure rates making this data sufficient for this analysis. We extracted the 96
elements or counters from the resource usage log as seen in Table 3.2. The
size of the time window (tw) chosen was based on two factors: (i) lead time
to failure - This is determined by root cause analysis of faults and research on
Ranger Rationalized logs (ratlog) has shown that the minimum lead time to
failure of most occurring faults is about 120 minutes [25], and (ii) The concept
of nodehour [106] was shown to be fine enough to capture erroneous messages.
To this end, we set tw = 60 minutes. This time window also allows us to
compare our work with Nodeinfo [106], a popular error detection approach.
We conducted the experiment on 720 sequences events logs with corresponding
resource usage data sequences of which 182 are faulty sequences.
Evaluation Metrics
In measuring the performance of our detection algorithm, we employ the widely
used sensitivity, specificity and what we called S-measure metric. The latter,
similar to the known F-measure, is the harmonic mean of sensitivity and speci-
ficity. Sensitivity, also called true positive rate or recall, measures the actual
proportion of correctly detected failure sequences to the total number of failure
sequences as expressed in Equation 5.8. Specificity, or true negative rate, mea-
sures the proportion of non-failure sequence which are detected as non-failure
2www.tacc.utexas.edu
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among all non-faulty sequences as seen in Equation 5.9. S-measure here is syn-
onymous with the usual F-measure in information retrieval, however, in this
case, it is the harmonic mean of sensitivity and specificity (see Equation 5.10).
Since sensitivity or specificity cannot be discussed in isolation, S-measure com-
bines the two providing us with a balanced detection accuracy.
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(5.8)
Specificity =
TN
FP + TN
(5.9)
S −measure = 2 ∗ Sensitivity ∗ Specificity
Sensitivity + Specificity
(5.10)
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Figure 5.6: Evaluation metrics
The parameters TP , FP , TN , and FN denotes true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives respectively. Figure 5.6 demonstrates the
relationship of these parameters. A perfect detection will have sensitivity and
specificity value of 1, meaning it can detect the faulty and non-faulty sequences
accurately.
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Failure Pattern Detection Performance
We aimed to show the detection accuracy of our methodology and then compare
our approach with Nodeinfo, a popular error detection approach proposed by
Oliner et al. [106].
In the experiments, we evaluated our approach under various conditions.
Since our approach is based on concepts such as anomaly score and entropy of a
sequence, we show the effectiveness of our detection methodology under different
values. The aim is to find value combinations where detection accuracy is better
achieved, i.e., a high true positive and true negative rate. We observed that a
change in mutual information threshold (µ) does not have as much influence on
the detection result as do the entropy threshold (ϕ) and the anomaly threshold
(γ) values. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 shows the results of detection with different
values of γ and ϕ. The best detection result is achieved for values of ϕ = 0.4
and γ = 0.6, achieving sensitivity (true positive rate) of about 80% and 78%
respectively. This result also demonstrates how the best value of the features
which affects detection the most are obtained. Note that the value of sensitivity
increases with increase in ϕ (see Figure 5.7); however, specificity increases with
corresponding increase in values of ϕ. Our approach is able to detect 80%
of errors that lead to failures. Further, with the high value of specificity, we
conclude that the false negative rate is also low.
It is worth noting here that the detection threshold is not dependent on the
system on which the approach is applied. It is dependent on how anomalous
the logs and the resource usage data of such systems are.
Since sensitivity is a measure of the true positive rate, it is best to detect all
faults if possible, and our approach demonstrates that about 80% of faults can
be detected. In another sense, it is important that false alarm is reduced (high
specificity). From Figure 5.8, we notice that the choice of anomaly threshold
(γ) affects detection. False positives tend to increase at values below 0.6 and
values greater than 0.6, resulting in reduced sensitivity. On the other hand,
specificity increases with increase in γ.
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Results implication: It is better to achieve higher sensitivity than speci-
ficity. This is because it is better to be safe and know that there is no potential
failure and deal with the false alarms than having potential failures go unde-
tected. However, it is expected that system faults and eventual failure should be
a rare activity, and when false alarm is high, it becomes a disadvantage and may
lead to unnecessary attempts towards avoiding failures that never even existed.
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Figure 5.7: Results showing accuracy of our detection approach under varying
values of entropy threshold (ϕ) and γ = 0.6.
Comparison with Nodeinfo
NodeInfo [106] is motivated by the assumption that similar computers executing
similar jobs should produce similar log contents. In that regard, as long as the
log lines are tokenizable, the idea can work. It equally leverages the“log.entry”
weighing scheme for calculating the entropy of a“nodehour” (nodes within an
hour), synonymous to documents in information theory. It first computes the
amount of information each token conveys with regards to the node that re-
ported it. Nodeinfo uses Shannon information entropy as defined in [122] to
calculate the information by each node. They further obtain and rank “node-
hours” according to how high information terms (Nodeinfo) they contain. Node-
hours, or what we called sequences of 60 minutes in size, with high Nodeinfo
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Figure 5.8: Results showing accuracy of our detection approach under varying
values of varying anomaly threshold, with ϕ = 0.4.
value, is regarded as faulty or containing alerts. We implemented this approach
(Nodeinfo [106]) and evaluated in on our event log data. We compare the perfor-
mance of Nodeinfo with our approach. Figure 5.9 shows the detection S-measure
of both methods. While our method performs consistently better with increase
in γ, Nodeinfo consistently decreases with increase Nodeinfo threshold. This
means that as we set the informativeness of a sequence to be high, Nodeinfo
detects fewer faulty sequences. Our method achieved on average (across all the
thresholds used, using S-measure) an improvement of about 50% over Nodeinfo.
Also, on the best anomaly threshold (0.4) it achieved an improvement of about
30%, that is, our approach can detect an additional 30% of faulty sequence over
Nodeinfo. This shows that the use of resource usage as a complement to event
logs, as proposed by our approach can be effective in increasing the accuracy of
error detection.
Runtime Performance Analysis
We implemented our algorithm in Java and ran it on a system with an Intel
i5 (3.10GHz) CPU to evaluate the runtime of the approach. The performance
(runtime) of our algorithm is not affected by detection thresholds but only
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Figure 5.9: Graph showing detection performance (S-measure) of our method
and nodeinfo
by the size of the data. This is mainly during the data transformation and
the process of obtaining the anomaly score. The PCA approach to anomaly
detection slightly increases the runtime, this is only true if the data is large.
Figure 5.10 demonstrates that the size of data3 has an impact on the run-
time performance. As the size of the logs increases, the runtime also increases;
however the increase is not exponential. The increase is gradual, and for a data
size of 300MB, the runtime is just about 4 minutes. This is not a challenge as
logs may not be this large within a time window; even if it were so, the time
taken to process it for detection is reasonably small. The detection process (Al-
gorithm 6) is very fast with just about 2-3 seconds and it is not dependent on
the data size at this point. The graph of Figure 5.10 shows the runtime of all
the steps involved.
3We add both resource usage data and error logs
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Figure 5.10: Graph showing runtime performance of our method
5.3 Detection of Recovery Patterns
5.3.1 Introduction
The faults that occur in cluster systems may or may not eventually lead to
a system failure. As rightly observed by Oliner et.al., [102], that in reality,
there exists no description of a correct system. This is true since so many
components are involved and system administrators are probably unaware of
some happenings within the system, sometimes until a problem is noticed. The
characterisation of these faults by Gainaru et. al., [43] provides an insight as to
how some failures behave. Sometimes, the anticipated failure as a result of these
faults and errors may eventually not occur. This happens for network faults if
a recovery is successfully completed [24], [23]; similarly, memory errors may be
corrected by error correction codes (ECC), even though, from the events logs,
there is every indication that these faults will result in failure [43]. That is,
looking at the event logs, the patterns of messages are indicative of impending
failure. Most times, it is very difficult for system administrators to know if faults
within such time eventually lead to the failure or not. Previous work [53] on
detecting faults using logs has shown that this problem contributes to increased
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false positives.
We want to identify those sequences which, from their patterns of events
are indicative of failure; however they eventually did not end up causing any
failure. We call such sequences recovery sequences while those that end in failure
as failure sequences. Obviously, event logs or error messages will not provide
the needed insight if such sequences end up in failure or not. We propose a novel
approach based on change point detection that detects such sequences. To the
best of our knowledge, this work presents the first insight into this problem
as we have not seen a work that gave it attention. The detection approach
demonstrates that resource usage/utilization data can be useful in identifying
recovery sequences.
5.3.2 Recovery Pattern Detection
To achieve our aim, resource utilization data or usage data is used. We reiterate
the point that the resource usage data provides us with an understanding of the
happenings within the system regarding how resources are being utilised. For
example, a high or low usage of memory or network resources or better still, a
sudden change in page swap rate could point to an abnormal behaviour which
may lead to failure. In essence, an abnormal use of resources is a pointer to
imminent failure.
We conjecture that a system which experienced a successful recovery from
network error or memory error corrected by ECC may behave differently in its
resource usage. Even though error messages may not provide a clear indica-
tion that failure will eventually occur, resource usage data within such time
could provide a hint. Usage data within such time window could show unusual
use/utilization, however, it may eventually recovered successfully and not end
in failure. Normal behaviour towards time of expected failure could point to
successful recovery.
In this section, we detail steps taken to identify sequences with successful
recovery from faults by detecting points of unusual or abnormal change within
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the sequence of resource utilization data for which failure is expected or has
occurred. We utilised the idea of change point detection (CPD) to perform
this. Before the technique could be applied however, the data must first be
transformed to a format that can be used easily by the algorithm.
Data Preparation
Resource usage data as earlier explained, contains how much resources are used
on a particular node as captured by different resource counters (see Table 3.2).
Each counter captures the amount of resources they are associated with. For
example, a network counter (rx mgs dropped) captures the amount of messages
dropped by a particular node.
Hence a line of logged usage data contains all the counters and their usage
values captured within a certain period. Let us call these lines of logged usage
data as events, ei. These events are streams of time series data. For the purpose
of our research, we capture these events within given time window, tw, called
subsequence, xi. A sequence, S = x1, x2, ..., xn, is then a stream of subsequences
as illustrated in Figure 5.11. It is worth noting here that the choice of tw may be
dependent on the time to failure of a fault and component. A reasonably small
time is chosen to avoid capturing different usage patterns within a subsequence;
however, the time should be large enough such that the subsequence is still
informative.
S= {e1, e2, e3, e4, …,  en-2, en-1, en} 
 
 
x1 x2 xn 
Figure 5.11: Sequence of resource usage data
We extract each xi as a vector of the sum of resource usage for each counter.
For example, given subsequence x1, with counter tx bytes: 267, read bytes: 302,
etc, then the vector x1=[267 302 ...]. Hence, the amount of resources used on
nodes ni in subsequence xi are summed up for each counter. These values are
then scaled to values between 0 and 1, forming a probability distribution. This
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is because the change point detection algorithm accepts the data as a probability
distribution. It also makes the data easier to handle and explained. We then
construct a matrix of the sequence where the subsequences forms row vectors.
Hence, given k number of counters and n subsequences, then the matrix M is
as given in Figure 5.12.
M =

x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,k
x2,1
.
.
.
xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,k

Figure 5.12: Data matrix M with n subsequences of S, where xn,k is the value
of counter k in subsequence n.
From the matrix M of Figure 5.12, a vector representing S is formed by
summing the values of each counter in a subsequence divided by the number of
counters. That is, subsequence x1 = xi,1 +xi,2 + ...+xi,k divided by k (counter
size). This is done for all the n subsequences. Hence, the vector forms the input
to the detection algorithm.
Change Point Detection
The objective of anomaly detection is to find a data point or data points that
behaves differently. The anomalousness now depends on the field of application
where an anomaly is a rare behaviour. Change Point Detection (CPD) [92, 130]
is an anomaly detection method where it detects “drastic change” observed from
a sequence distribution. These points of drastic change are possible anomalies.
Two classes of CPD are commonly used depending on the problem; they are:
Real-time change-point detection and Retrospective change-point detection [92].
The former deals with detecting real-time changes in applications, a good exam-
ple is responses in robots. The later deals with applications with longer response
times and it is also used to deal with retrospective data.
In this work, we employ retrospective CPD to detect sudden changes in the
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utilisation of resources by a supercomputer system. Such sudden change could
point to abnormal behaviour in the system. For example, a sudden peak in
memory or network resource usage could signal the presence of faults and/or
errors.
The reason for the choice of CPD approach in this study is connected to
the nature of our data. The resource usage data are collected and logged as
streams of time series data which is formed by the probability distributions of
the resources used on a node by running jobs. Therefore, the level at which
resources are utilised may vary with time and this changes can be captured
using CPD. This is our motivation for using change point detection. We will
discuss briefly two Retrospective CPD approaches we employed in this work.
Cumulative Sum Change-Point Detection: Cumulative Sum (CuSUM)
CPD approach [130, 131], is based on the fact that a sudden change in parameter
value corresponds to a change in the expected value of log-likelihood ratio. From
the name, it tracks the cumulative sums of the differences between the values
and the average. At points where the values are above average, the cumulative
sum steadily increases. Therefore this method involves finding the mean and its
difference with observation values.
Given series of data S = x1, x2, . . . , xn, we first initialise the cumulative
sum, cS0 = 0 and obtain the mean of S (the row vectors), given as x¯,
cSi+1 = cSi + (xi+1 − x¯) (5.11)
for all i = 1...n.
Abrupt change points are those points with cSi values above a certain thresh-
old value.
Divergence-Based Dissimilarity Measure: In this approach, a dissimi-
larity measure is introduced. We used Kullback Divergence (KLD) measure [92].
The Kullback Divergence of two sequence distributions x and y (for simplic-
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ity, we assume x = xi and y = xi+1) is given by:
KLD(x‖y) =
∑
i
x(i)log
x(i)
y(i)
(5.12)
where i is the index of probability values of vectors x and y.
Figure 5.13 shows the CPD charts of sequences that end in failure and one
that recover. It can be noticed that usage observation values decreases for the
recovery sequences as time progresses. It is lower for the recovery compared to
failure sequence. This gives an indication into how these two sequences could
behave based on how the resources are being used (during failure, recovery).
We utilised this for our detection algorithm explained in the next section.
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Figure 5.13: Graph showing the change point behaviours of both recovery and
failure sequences
Detection
We detect multiple change points within a failure sequence. We conjecture
that sequences that eventually end in failure are likely to contain change points
and/or a sustain presence of such points leading up to time of failure. Mean-
while, sequences that eventually experience recovery may not contain many
change points or sustained change points leading up to expected time of failure.
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These sequences may be characterised by relatively normal resource utilization
if there is a successful recovery from faults. Given the observations of usage
data xi within a sequence S, that is, S = x1, x2, ..., xn, where observations,
xi, are made within a certain time interval and the time of occurrence of xi,
tx1 < tx2 < ... < txn , then we conjecture that for any failure sequence S, an
abnormal use of the resources can be noticed throughout the sequence and it
is likely to be sustained across tx1 to txn . However, a recovery sequence will
likely experience normal behaviour or normal resource usage as the time ap-
proaches failure. This implies that it may likely contain less change points as it
approaches the expected failure time.
Algorithm 7 Recovery sequence detection
1: procedure Detect(S, th) . th is the detection threshold
2: cp = null . keeps the list of points above threshold
3: xi ∈ S . vectors (subsequences) of S
4: for i = 1 to |S| − 1 do
5: p(xi) =CPD(xi, xi+1) . CPD represents either KLD or CuSUM.
6: if (p(xi) >= th then . th is change point threshold
7: add point (i) to list of change points (cp)
8: end if
9: end for
10: if (if there are more than a point i greater than midpoint) then
11: return Failure
12: else
13: return Recovery
14: end if
15: end procedure
From Algorithm 7, we detect multiple change points within the sequence.
We keep the points which are seen as change points for the sequence. The
sequence with change points occurring beyond the midpoint of the sequence
will likely end in failure as earlier explained.
5.3.3 Results
Our aim is to develop a methodology to detect sequences that recovered from
faults and did not end in failure. These sequences contribute to false positives
on the earlier failure detection approach since they they equally produce event
118
5. Improving Error Detection Using Resource Usage Data and Event Logs
messages indicative of failure. To achieve this aim, we utilized the resource
usage data of the Ranger supercomputer and not the error logs. The approach
is then evaluated by conducting experiments on the resource usage data.
As earlier explained in Chapter 3, the resource usage data were collected us-
ing TACC Stats [59] that takes snapshots of utilization data of the 96 counters.
The snapshots are taken within ten-minute intervals . Jobs generate their re-
source usage data on a particular node, which are then logged to the file system.
The data is logged by each node through a centralized message logging system.
The logs are combined and interleaved in time.
From the data, more failures actually took place within the first and second
weeks of March 2012 with few occurring in the third and fourth weeks. Among
these failure sequences are those that eventually did not end up in failure, but
experienced a recovery. We had a total of 720 sequences of which 182 are real
failure sequences and 72 recovery sequences.
In the experiments, we evaluate our approach under various detection thresh-
old values. The values of detection threshold, th is varied to obtain better values
for both sensitivity and specificity. We show results and discuss the two CPD
methods (CuSUM, KLD) used.
From the results seen in Figure 5.14 for using CuSUM approach, the true
positive rate (sensitivity) performs poorly at th = 0.1, 0.2. It consistently in-
creased (maximum sensitivity of about 90%) as the value of th is increased. This
shows that the more we increase the value th, the better the detection of the
recovery sequences. It achieved highest sensitivity at th = 0.7, which remains
constant for higher values of th. Likewise, the specificity is highest at lower val-
ues of th as expected and reduces from 70% to 20% at th = 0.6 and remains so
for higher values. These results demonstrate that we can achieve good detection
of recovery sequences when we use CuSUM change point detection method. For
this approach (CuSUM), a better result (S-measure) is obtained at threshold
th = 0.3 as seen in Figure 5.10. It achieved about 63% detection. However, the
high false positive and false negative rates renders this approach less effective.
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Figure 5.14: Result showing accuracy of detecting recovery sequences among
failure sequences using Cumulative Sum change point detection and varying
values of detection threshold, th
.
Similarly, using KLD method (see Figure 5.15), the results are similar to
CuSUM. A highest sensitivity of about 84% is observed when th = 0.5 and more.
The specificity on the other hand, decreases with increase in th. The lowest
specificity (10%) is obtained at th = 0.6 and remained so for higher values.
Comparatively, CuSUM seems to slightly perform better over all the thresholds
used. However, looking at the S-measure in Figure 5.16, KLD performed high
with detection of 64% at th = 0.2. This result is almost similar with the
CuSUM approach (1% difference); the only difference is that they are achieved
at different detection thresholds.
Based on these results, it is very possible to achieve good detection of se-
quences which did not end in failure (recovery sequences) from usage data. Even
though, this is not the best performance expected, however, it is a good start-
ing point for exploring the use of resource utilisation data of cluster systems
to detect both failure sequences and recovery sequences applying change point
detection method. One main challenge with our method is the insufficiency of
data, that is the number of recovery and failure sequences. We believe a better
result can be achieved if more data containing identified failures and recovery
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Figure 5.15: Results showing accuracy of detecting recovery sequences among
failure sequences using KLD change point detection, and varying values of de-
tection threshold, th.
sequences are available. The four weeks data we used, as earlier mentioned, ex-
perienced more failure and recovery within the first two weeks of cluster system
operation and very few at weeks three and four. We speculate here that this
approach may not be the best for faults with no impact on resource utilization.
This is because it depends fully on the how the resources are used.
5.4 Improving Failure Pattern Detection
The performance of the failure pattern detection discussed in previous sections
can be improved by combining the detection approach with detecting recovery
patterns. The idea is that recovery patterns if detected can reduce the number
of false positives. This is because most times, the recovery patterns behave
similar to failure patterns. Hence, it explains the poor specificity values of the
detection algorithm.
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Figure 5.16: Graph showing detection performance (S-measure) of both CPD
methods used
5.4.1 PCA and CPD Failure Detection Algorithm
We have shown earlier that these recovery patterns can be identified with about
65% detection accuracy4. The motivation here is that by combining the PCA-
failure detection approach and the CPD-recovery detection methods, we could
improve the general performance of the failure detection.
The detection based on the CPD and the PCA discussed earlier is performed
as follows: A pattern detected as failure by the PCA-detection seen in Algo-
rithm 5 is only a failure if the same pattern is not a recovery pattern based
on CPD Algorithm 7 discussed. This step stems from the fact that recovery
patterns are non-failure patterns, and these patterns can easily be detected as
failure patterns due to the nature of the events logged (which are most times
indicative of impending failure). This approach is aimed at reducing the de-
tection false positives due to the recovery patterns. It is expected that the
combined PCA and CPD failure detection algorithm will bring about improved
identification of non-failure patterns.
4by detection accuracy here, we mean detection sensitivity
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5.4.2 Results
Similar to the experiment in Section 5.2.5, we conducted the experiment and
maintained the evaluation metrics. The value for CPD threshold is chosen as
th = 0.2, as this is the value for which recovery detection was highest (see
Figure 5.16).
From the results of Figure 5.17, the sensitivity decreases with increase in
the anomaly threshold (γ) values. On the other hand, specificity, as expected,
increases with increase in γ. The highest value of sensitivity is achieved by
combining both PCA and CPD-detection is about 71% at γ = 0.4. With increase
in detection threshold5, more faulty patterns are detected as normal patterns
(false negative increases). This implies that the anomalousness of a pattern
doesn’t have to be very high for it to lead to failure. In essence, a system that
demonstrates above 50% anomalousness has about 71% chance of resulting in a
failure.
The CPD part of the algorithm is meant to reduce the false positives that
arise from the algorithm. Most times, these patterns contain events that indicate
the presence of failure, however the system experiences recovery. In particular,
the CPD is aimed at improving specificity which increases with increase in γ,
as seen Figure 5.17.
Comparing the performance of this approach (PCA and CPD) with detec-
tion explained in previous sections (based on PCA-anomaly, event entropy and
mutual information), we can clearly see that the latter performs better. This
can be explained as from CPD-recovery detection, the performance was about
65%; with 35% wrongly detected recovery patterns. This contributes to the
reduced performance when the two methods are combined. Hence we conclude
that, unless a better performance is achieved in detecting recovery patterns, the
combination of PCA and CPD for detection does not help.
5when the resource usage deviation from normal is reasonably high before we suspect an
anomalous behaviour in the system
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Figure 5.17: Graph showing detection performance of combining detection based
on PCA-anomaly and CPD-Recovery.
5.5 Summary
In summary, this chapter’s main and novel contributions are as follows:
• We develop an algorithm that uses the console logs to detect erroneous
runs. The algorithm achieves this by clustering together nodes that exhibit
similar behaviour, through the use of the mutual information and entropy
concepts.
• Usage log data provide an understanding of cluster systems resource uti-
lization. Abnormally high utilization may suggest an impending failure
due to some errors in the system. To be able to capture the anomalous be-
haviour of jobs running within the system, we employ an unsupervised de-
tection approach, PCA, to do this. Highly anomalous jobs present within
a sequence signify the presence of faults which could lead to failure.
• Lastly, we utilised both the patterns mutual information and entropy from
event logs and the outlier/anomaly level of sequences from its resource
usage data to detect if a sequence is likely to lead to failure or not. We
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propose a detection algorithm based on these systems information from
both event logs and resource usage data. We then compare our method
with an existing approach.
Our approach is very promising: it is able to detect faulty sequences with
high accuracy and, when compared to the well-known Nodeinfo approach [106],
it outperforms it greatly.
Relation to other chapters: This chapter has shown that errors can be
detected with high accuracy. The question that follows is: can failure preven-
tion or avoidance or error handling methods like checkpointing be successfully
completed before an impending failure is experienced? This question is valid
since preventive checkpointing6 is said be a promising approach in the exascale
computing era [16]: hence there is a need to extend the error handling time if
possible. The next chapter addresses this problem.
6Triggered whenever an error is detected
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CHAPTER 6
Early Error Detection for Increasing the Error Handling
Time Window
6.1 Introduction
HPC systems’ failure is a recurrent event owing to its scale and complexity.
Given that dependability is an important property for such systems, the abil-
ity to properly handle (fail-stop) errors is crucial. One of the fundamental
approaches to handle such failures makes use of the checkpoint-restart (C/R)
technique, where the application state is saved at regular interval during execu-
tion (i.e., checkpoint) and restarted at the latest checkpoint, in case of a failure.
However, the C/R technique faces one major challenge: the checkpoint time is
significant, roughly currently in the order of 25− 30 minutes [14, 16]. However,
it is predicted that, on very large scale platforms (e.g., exascale platforms), with
expected Mean Time To Interrupt predicted to be very low (one hour or less),
little progress can be made due to the significant proportion of time devoted to
C/R [11, 14]. A possible alternative to checkpointing is task migration but one
of the limitations of this technique is that checkpointing is again required to
deal with false negatives (i.e., when the system does not detect an impending
failure) [16], making C/R a cornerstone for building resilience into HPC sys-
tems. Another approach is to combine proactive checkpointing (where the state
of a given node is saved) with preventive checkpointing(the state of the entire
system is saved), supported by accurate failure prediction [11].
Thus, to address the checkpointing (or error handling) time, there are several
research avenues being pursued. One way of reducing the C/R proportion is to
reduce the size of the checkpoint. With little data being available regarding the
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typical size of a checkpoint, it is widely believed that programmers save more
data than required as they cannot easily track data structures updates between
checkpoints. Thus, techniques such as memory exclusion and compiler analysis
to detect dead variables have been proposed. Another alternative to reduce
checkpointing time is to reduce the usage of disks to store checkpoints [16].
However, one technique which holds promise is preventive checkpointing [16]:
Error detection (or failure prediction) is used to trigger a checkpoint before the
error propagates through the system. To enable this technique, two important
challenges exist: (i) developing efficient error detection techniques (to trigger
checkpointing) and (ii) the time window between the time of error detection
and the actual failure needs to be large enough (to allow for checkpointing to
complete) and also for the system to make progress. With the size of RAM
memory expected to increase, techniques need to be developed to keep this
time window as large as possible. We call this time window the error handling
time window, which is the focus of this paper.
Detecting fault symptoms (i.e., errors) using error logs has received good
attention, with reasonably good results, e.g., [9, 43, 112, 147]. Most of these
approaches have attempted to identify individual faulty events within the data.
However, in many cases, individual events may not be sufficient to indicate an
impending system failure. Other approaches for error detection within patterns
or faulty patterns/sequence in the recent past have used the concept of log
entropy of the log messages seen within the sequences [93, 96, 106]. Log entropy
generally leverages the inherent changes in the frequency of event patterns to
capture the behaviour of a system. Oliner et al. [106] attempted to capture
the sequence information, or what they called Nodeinfo, of a nodehour, an area
within which the log can be considered as faulty. A recent approach combines
both entropy and the concept of mutual information of patterns to discriminate
between faulty and non-faulty patterns [53].
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6.1.1 Motivation
The systems executes resource-intensive applications such as scientific applica-
tions which require the architecture or the system to display a very high level of
dependability to mitigate the impact of faults. As earlier stated, typical error
handling techniques such as checkpointing and task migrations are expensive as
they incur a high completion latency. To ensure the success of such techniques,
enough time should be allowed for these to complete, i.e., the error handling
time should be greater than the completion latency of the error handling mech-
anisms. However, error detection based on event logs may leave a short error
handling time window insufficient for such mechanisms to complete. Also, the
log files are known to be incomplete, i.e., the log entries do not provide sufficient
information regarding the behaviour of HPC systems that can be used to accu-
rately detect errors in the system and redundant, i.e., several log entries may be
due to the same event. The logs may contain several error events that relate to
the same fault. These issues make error prediction or failure prediction based
on error log files challenging, leaving a small error handling time window.
6.1.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we explain the problem we address in this paper, and the chal-
lenges associated with it.
Log messages that are error messages capture the nature of the underlying
problems in the system. However, due to the incompleteness nature of event
logs, a single error message may not accurately predict an impending failure.
For example, a loaded network may cause a network timeout. However, this
single event may be later followed by a retransmission after which, a successful
recovery is achieved. Thus, to increase the accuracy1 of failure prediction, the
behaviour of the system needs to be observed over a period of time. It is
stipulated that some failures can be predicted with more than 60% accuracy [14].
Because of the high overhead associated with false positives, the prediction of
1Accuracy here is the ability to detect actual failures while also reducing false positives
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a failure based on the observation of an error message is not advised. Rather,
to keep high accuracy while minimizing false positives entails observation of
an erroneous event sequence for failure prediction. Thus, the problem is to
develop a methodology such that (i) accurate failure prediction is high and (ii)
the failure lead time is high, enabling the system to make sustained progress
even after checkpointing is done (or enough time for checkpointing to complete).
We now pose the main problem we address in this paper as follows: Given an
event log file F , and possibly a set of other log files F1, . . . , Fn, a time window
We for event log analysis, and a time window Wi for every other log file Fi,
develop a methodology such that the time window between the time of failure
prediction and the time of system failure is high. We call this time window the
error handling time window, as this is the amount of time the system has to
tolerate the fault, i.e., correct the error, before failure occurs.
6.1.3 Objectives of the Chapter
To complement error log files, this chapter propose the use of resource usage
information to aid in early error detection. Particularly, it seeks to detect errors
early with high probability so as to increase the error handling time window
so that recovery procedures such as C/R can successfully complete [54]. To
increase the time window, we propose a novel approach based on the observation
that anomalous resource usage could lead to system failure [25]. Thus, in this
chapter, we seek to develop a methodology that combines both resource usage
data and error logs to obtain a larger time window to support error handling.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The methodology
or the steps taken towards solving the problem is discussed in Section 6.2, we
presented the case study and results in Section 6.3. We briefly summarise the
chapter’s contributions in Sections 6.4.
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6.2 Methodology
Our approach thus proposed to use another log file, namely resource usage
data, which reports the amount of resources that are being utilised by each
job on a node. Inconsistent or anomalous amount of resource usage by jobs
on a particular node could point to potential problem in the system, that can
eventually lead to system failure [25]2.
In this section, we detail our methodology, based on both event logs and
resource usage logs, for obtaining an increased error handling time window.
The workflow starts with the time of the failure as input, which we denote by
Tf . We first conduct (i) a root-cause analysis on the event logs to obtain the
time Te at which the root-cause event of the failure occurred, with Te < Tf .
(ii) We then run an anomaly detection algorithm on the resource usage data
to identify the job(s) with anomalous resource usage data. The first time this
anomaly occurs, prior to Te, within a given time window Wr is noted. We
denote this time by Tr. We further attempt to push back the failure prediction
time through (iii) the detection of change points. The rationale behind this
is that when a resource usage anomaly occurs, this anomaly cannot happen
in one step. Rather, it happens in a few steps. For example, if the workload
suddenly increases, the job may request more and more resources (over a certain
time) rather than the request being serviced in one go. Thus, the observation
of change points may indicate impending failure. We now explain the main
techniques involved in our methodology as depicted in Figure 6.1.
6.2.1 Root Cause Analysis
Event logs of large cluster systems are made up of streams of interleaved events.
This is because of the high degree of interactions among the system hardware
and software components. Most times, only a small fraction of the events over a
small time span are relevant or could point to pending failure, i.e., only a small
2Observe that this may not always be the case. For example, a job starting will suddenly
acquire a relatively large amount of resources to run, though this is not anomalous.
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Figure 6.1: Methodology work flow
proportion of these events are error events. Identifying the causes of system
failures is necessary and event logs being a source of health information, system
administrators have to identify the small useful fraction of the events that are
related to the failure. Such an activity is typically very challenging. In order
to trace the likely root-causes of failure in logs, we identify events that are
highly correlated with frequently occurring failures. We use an established fault
diagnostic tool called FDiag [23, 24] for this purpose. It extracts from large
event logs of cluster systems, error events which are regarded as causing system
failures. These events are those which are highly correlated with the failure
events. Given a time window We before the failure, we seek root-causes within
We. FDiag basically works as follows: Given a known system failure, FDiag
identifies patterns of system events which occur across the nodes of the cluster
system, extracts only the correlated events (with the failure). These pattern of
events identified are within given time period, providing the fault events and the
time for which they occur. FDiag [24] employ statistical correlation approach
to obtain these faults which causes recurrent failure.
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6.2.2 Anomaly Detection
An impending failure in a cluster system is manifested in event logs but some-
times are not logged early enough before the failure occurs. The behaviours
which are highly correlated with failures may not manifest early in the logs; in
other words, the sequence of errors are reported too late especially for prediction
purposes. On the other hand, resource utilization data or usage data records
how the resources are being used by the running jobs on each node. These usage
data can record early abnormal behaviour experienced by each job on a partic-
ular node [40]. It has been shown that a correlation exists between anomalous
resource usage and system failures [25] and Gabel et al. [40] has demonstrated
that counters can indeed capture latent faults and that these can be detected.
In this section, we explain our approach for extracting anomalous running jobs,
which are conjectured to be indicators of a problem within the cluster system,
before these problems manifest themselves in the event logs. We also extract
the time for which anomalous behaviour is experienced. However, for a given
root-cause, there may be several preceding resource usage anomaly, we impose
a time window Wr preceding the root-cause, during which we take the time at
which the first anomaly is noted. We denote this time by Tr. We first have
to transform the resource usage data into a form suitable for analysis, before
explaining the anomaly detection algorithms used in this paper.
Data Transformation
The resource usage data contains records of each jobs running on a particular
node with values for its usage as carried by the elements/counters. In order
to appropriately capture the behaviour of the system with these nodes and it
running jobs, there is need to transform this data into a format (matrix) that
can be used easily. The data which captures how much resources is being used
inherently describes the state of the system within a given time window. As
earlier said, abnormal resource usage could point to potential system failure [25].
In order to detect these abnormalities in resource usage, we properly extract the
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counters or attributes/elements, where the state of the resources for each job
on each node within given time are captured. Hence, from the resource usage
data, the time window used is dependent on the time of event fault. Given the
time at which first fault is observed from the event logs is Te (from root cause
analysis of fault in previous section), then, time, Tx, under which the resource
usage data will be considered is Tx = Te− tw, where tw is the time at which we
begin to observe anomalous behaviour.
A Resource Usage Feature matrix is formed, where the features are the jobs
running on each node within time Tx. For any k counters and n running jobs,
we construct a n × k feature matrix J = [j1, j2, ..., jn]T ∈ <n×k with columns
representing the counters or the elements of the resource usage and the row
vector ji = [ji,1, ji,2, ..ji,k], i = (1, 2, ..., n) representing the different running
jobs on each node. Figure 6.2 describes the matrix.
J =

j1,1 j1,2 . . . j1,k
j2,1
.
.
.
jn,1 jn,2 . . . jn,k

Figure 6.2: Data matrix J with i features, where jn,k is the value of counter k
by job n.
The intersection of row vector value and column vector, jik represents the
resource usage for job i by counter/element k. These resource usage values are
summed for each similar counter within same time window and the same job.
Specifically, jik = usage values of counter k reported by job i. This basically
captures each jobs resource usage on a particular node.
Anomalous Job Extraction
The resource usage data contains information about how the resources resources
(e.g. CPU, I/O transfer rates, virtual memory utilization) of each of these
nodes by each job running in the cluster system are utilised or used. It provides
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useful hint regarding unusual behaviour of given jobs in terms of its rate of
resource utilization within given time. In order detect unusual jobs, we use the
transformed resource usage data features as seen in matrix of Figure 6.2 as input
data to our detection algorithm. This section aim at obtaining anomalous jobs
which could significantly point to problem(s) in the cluster as observed by the
anomaly score of the jobs within a period.
We introduce an unsupervised approach to detecting anomalous jobs based
on principal component analysis (PCA) [84] and independent component anal-
ysis (ICA). Both have been a widely and efficiently used feature extraction
method in different fields and also for identifying anomalous node behaviour [80].
However, both methods can reveal the inner structure of data and are suitable
in explaining the variance. Other anomaly detection methods, such as one-class
SVM [72], are supervised approaches that require the data to be labelled, which
is expensive. PCA has been previously shown to be effective in detecting faults
in systems using console logs [147], hence our reason for employing both PCA
and ICA in this work. We utilise these methods to find anomalous jobs from
resource usage data.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA is utilised in the chapter in similar way as explained in previous chapter;
where, given J = [j1
T , j2
T , ..., jn
T ] ∈ <n×k, and each row ji representing k −
dimension data instances of jobs, the v-dominant eigenvectors are obtained.
Independent Component Analysis, (ICA)
ICA [66] is a technique used to find linear representation of variables, measure-
ments to reveal their independence. This involves revealing the linear transfor-
mation that maximises the statistical independence between its components. It
is a generative model that assumes that components are statistically indepen-
dent and these components are also assumed to be non-gaussian in distribution.
We adopt the FastICA [66] algorithm implementation of the ICA, for its
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fast and efficient performance. The process involved in performing ICA is
summarised as follows: A centering of the data is performed. This is a pre-
processing step for ICA that involves making the random vector a zero-mean
variable by subtracting its mean vector. The next preprocessing step is whiten-
ing. In this step, the observed vector variables, x, are linearly transformed
into a new vector x¯ with uncorrelated components with unit variance, that is,
x¯x¯T = I. This step is done using eigen-value decomposition (EVD) of the co-
variance matrix C. The non-zero eigenvalues, λi of the covariance matrix, C,
are obtained . Let J = diag(λ1, λ2, ..., λk), E = [e1, e2, ..., ek], then a whitened
vector x¯ = EV −
1
2ETx.
Recent and detail advances on ICA can be found in [65].
Anomalous Jobs Detection in Usage logs Using PCA or ICA
We utilize both PCA and ICA to identify anomalous jobs running in a cluster
system within a given time window from the resource usage data features. The
approach is based on an assumption that, for every data point, removing or
adding it contributes to the behaviour of the most dominant direction. This is
because PCA/ICA relies on calculating the mean and the data covariance matrix
in obtaining eigenvectors, and it is observed to be sensitive to the presence of
an outlier. Hence, in this approach, the outlierness of a job can be determined
by the variation in the dominant principal direction. Specifically, by removing
an outlier point or job, the direction of dominant principal component changes
however a normal data point will not change it.
So, given data points J = [j1
T , j2
T , ..., jn
T ], the leading principal direction
d from J is extracted. Then, for each data point ji, we obtain the leading
principal component, di, of J without ji. We use cosine similarity to compute
the outlierness ai of point ji, which is the dissimilarity between d and ji. The
algorithm presented in Algorithm 8 is used to compute the set of anomalous
jobs. A point is considered anomalous when its “outlierness” is greater than a
given threshold γ.
The same algorithm follows for the ICA detection approach, where the lead-
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ing independent component is computed instead of the leading principal com-
ponent.
Algorithm 8 Extracting anomalous jobs and time from usage data
1: procedure AnomalousJob(J, γ)
2: d = Leading principal/independent direction of J
3: k = 0
4: aList . keep list of anomalous jobs
5: atime . time of first anomaly
6: for each ji in J do
7: di = Leading principal/independent direction of J without data
point ji.
8: sim(di, d) =
di · d
‖di‖‖d‖
9: ai = 1− |sim(di, d)|
10: if (ai ≥ γ) then
11: aList.Add(ji)
12: aT ime = time(ji) . keep only the earliest time when anomaly
occur
13: k + +
14: end if
15: end for
16: if (k > 0) then
17: Return aList and aT ime . return all anomalous jobs and the
earliest time
18: else
19: Return No anomalous jobs
20: end if
21: end procedure
An example of the output of Algorithm 5 is shown in Figure 6.3, after running
Algorithm 8 with PCA on the resource usage data for the Ranger supercom-
puter. The points in red indicate the likely anomalous jobs. Figure 6.4 shows
the anomalous jobs after running Algorithm 8 with ICA on the same dataset.
Obtaining Counter Relationships
In this section, we describe our approach to uncover possible relationships that
exist among resource counters. These relationships can indicate that particular
resources are the causes of an anomaly. For example, does a high mmap counter
value have any correlation with the dirty page hits counter and if so, what does
it mean to the behaviour of running jobs in the cluster, or can it point to any
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normal or abnormal behaviour? This section aimed to look at the categories of
counters (network, memory or storage).
Any unusual behaviour of the resource counters can be detected using PCA
or ICA anomaly detection. We first employ the PCA approach to obtain anoma-
lous counters. The behaviour of the counters is unclear, with most of them
behaving the same (hidden relationships). This can be attributed to the fact
that PCA assumes a Gaussian distribution of the data. Hence, in order to un-
derstand the relationships between the counters, in this case, we employ the
idea of Maximal Information Coefficient (MIC) by Reshef et al., [113]. MIC is
promising and it has not been used in this area before.
MIC is a measure of dependence for two-variable relationships. It calculates
the measure of dependence for each pair, rank them and further examine their
top scoring pairs. If a relationship exists between two variables, then a grid can
be drawn on the scatterplot of the variables that partitions the data encapsu-
lating the very relationship. Hence, all grids up to the maximal grid resolution
are explored; computing the largest possible Mutual Information (MI) for every
pair of integers (n, k) dependent on the sample size. The values of these MIs are
further normalised to values between 0 and 1 to enforce fair comparison between
grids of different dimensions. A characteristic matrix J is defined as J = (jn,k),
where jn,k is the highest normalised MI achieved by n-by-k grid, and MIC is
the maximum value of M.
Formally, for a grid G, let IG denote the mutual information of the prob-
ability distribution induced on the boxes of G, where the probability of a box
is proportional to the number of data points falling inside the box. Then the
characteristic matrix, Jn,k as shown below.
Jn,k = max
IG
log(min(n, k))
(6.1)
MIC is the maximum of Jn,k over ordered pairs (n, k).
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6.2.3 Change Point Detection
The Change Point Detection (CPD) [92, 130] is an anomaly detection method
where a ”drastic change” observed from a sequence distribution is detected.
These points of sudden change may be indicators of impending possible anoma-
lies. It can be performed as a real-time change-point detection or retrospective
change-point detection [92], depending on suitability. The former deals with
detecting real-time changes in applications. A good example is responses in
robots. On the other hand, the latter is mostly employed for applications with
longer response time and deals with retrospective data.
In this work, we employ the retrospective CPD to detect sudden changes in
the utilisation of resources by a supercomputer system. Such sudden changes
may point to possible abnormal behaviours in the system. For example, a sudden
peak in usage of memory or network resources could signal the presence of errors
in the system. Resource usage data are collected and logged as streams of time
series data which are formed by the probability distributions of the resources
used on a node by running jobs. Therefore, the level at which resources are
utilised may vary with time and these changes can be captured using CPD.
This is our motivation for using change point detection as an alternative to job
anomalies. Specifically, we use change points as anomaly indicators and, since
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job anomaly are good failure predictors, by extension we seek to determine
the suitability of change points as good failure predictors. We employed the
cumulative sum change point detection technique in this work, as explained
below.
Cumulative Sum Change-Point Detection: Cumulative Sum (CuSUM)
CPD approach [130, 131], is based on the fact that sudden change in parameter
corresponds to a change in the expected value of log-likelihood ratio. From
the name, it tracks the cumulative sums of the differences between the values
and the average. At points where the values are above average, the cumulative
sum steadily increases. Therefore this method involve finding the mean and its
difference with observation values.
Given S = x1, x2, . . . , xn, we first initialise the cumulative sum, cS0 = 0 and
obtain the mean of S, given as x¯,
cSi+1 = cSi + (xi+1 − x¯) (6.2)
for all i = 1...n.
Any abrupt change points are those points with cSi values above a threshold
th.
Preparing data for CPD algorithm: A line of logged usage data contains all
the counters and their usage values captured within a certain time period. We
refer to these lines of logged usage data as resource events (or simply events),
ei
3. These events are streams of time series data. for the purpose of our research,
we capture these events within a given time window, tw = 10 minutes, which
we call a subsequence, xi. A sequence, S = x1, x2, . . . , xn, is then a stream of
subsequences, as illustrated in Figure 5.11 (in chapter 5). A reasonably small
tw is chosen to avoid capturing different usage patterns within a subsequence
and also big enough for such subsequence to be informative.
Hence, each xi is a vector of the sum of resource usage for each counter.
3We refer to both log entries and resource usage data as events. However, the sources of
these events will make the nature of the events clear.
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The amount of resources used on all the nodes in a subsequence is summed
up for each counter. These values are then scaled to values between 0 and 1
to form a probability distribution. This is because the CPD algorithm accepts
the data as a probability distribution (this also becomes easier to handle and
explained). Figure 6.6 illustrates the outcome of applying CuSUM on a sequence
of resource usage data. At point 5, a sudden increase in change point values
can be observed, signalling a potential problem in the system.
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Figure 6.6: Example showing result of CuSUM CPD on a sequence
6.2.4 Lead Times
The aim of any fault analysis is to provide an opportunity for preventive or
corrective mechanisms to be taken; that is, system administrators can rectify the
problem and/or employ measures that predict or prevent occurrences of failures.
The longer the time between the identification of an anomalous behaviour and
the time of failure, the higher is the probability of an error handling procedure
to complete successfully.
Therefore, from Algorithm 5, we first extract the set aList of anomalous jobs,
with the time Tfra (see Figure 6.7) being the earliest time when an anomalous
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job has been identified. The time Tfe (see Figure 6.7) is the first time when
an error, diagnosed as a potential root-cause of the system failure F occurring
at time Tff . The time Tfcp defines the time at which the first change point
occurs in the resource usage, i.e., there can be several time periods during which
change-points occur and we are only interested in the first such time period.
We obtain the anomaly, error, failure lead times, which we denote by δTc, δTa, δTe
respectively, as the times between when the earliest change-point (resp. anoma-
lous job and error) is experienced to when an anomaly (resp. a hypothesized
root-cause, failure) is first identified, and are defined as follows:
δTc = Tfra − Tfcp (6.3)
δTa = Tfe − Tfra (6.4)
δTe = Tff − Tfe (6.5)
Another important aspect is the relationship between the counters, that may
point to a fault, captured by the values of MIC, as explained in Section 6.2.2.
The MIC values for a sample of the relationship is shown in Table 6.1. An entry
in the table means that, within the time window being considered, for example,
two counters, such as rx bytes dropped and direct write with MIC ≈ 1, there is
high tendency that there is high drop in data when there is an unusually high
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data written to storage. Table 6.1 shows the correlation of few pairs of counters
with value of MIC ≥ 0.8.
Table 6.1: Sample Results of Counter correlations (MIC)
counter1 counter2 MIC
alloc inode statfs 0.98425
direct read setxattr 1.0
direct read getattr 0.96307
dirty pages hits direct write 0.96166
mmap alloc inode 0.93
read bytes dirty pages hits 1.0
rx bytes dropped direct write 0.98425
rx msgs mmap 0.81772
6.3 Case Study: Ranger Supercomputer
In this section, we demonstrate our proposed methodology on logs and resource
usage data obtained from the Ranger supercomputer from the Texas Advanced
Computing Center (TACC) at the University of Texas at Austin4 and discuss
the results.
6.3.1 Datasets and Performance Measurement
The structure of the datasets have been explained in chapter 3. The data was
collected over a period of 4 weeks, with 32GB worth of resource usage data
and 1.2 GB worth of rationalized event logs (or ratlog). The datasets are not
labelled, i.e., they are not enhanced with any further failure information than
what they already carry.
Performance Measurement: The objective of the paper is to develop a
methodology to increase the time window during which error handling proce-
dures can be successfully completed. This increase in time period, which we call
the propagation time, is given by:
propagation time = anomaly lead time + error lead time (6.6)
4www.tacc.utexas.edu
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However, this increase should be linked to situations leading to a possible
system failure, i.e., the increased time window should not occur due to a high
rate of false positives (good system behaviours wrongly identified as failure
pattern).
Thus, to measure the performance of the methodology, we use the so-called
F-measure metric, which is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. Precision
captures the proportion of patterns that are correctly identified as failure pat-
terns to the total number of patterns identified as failures (correct or not). On
the other hand, recall captures the proportion of accurate failure patterns iden-
tifications to the total number of actual failure patterns. Specifically, f-measure
achieves a balance between true and false positives.
6.3.2 Base Case for Comparison - Error Detection La-
tency using Clustering
We now develop a base case for analyzing the performance of our methodology.
We use the methodology developed in chapter 4, which is also seen in [53]
for failure detection. The ability to predict failure provides the basis for the
development of an error detection mechanism, i.e., once a failure is predicted
(with high probability), then a flag indicating the presence of an error can be
raised.
We processed the event logs of the Ranger supercomputer as follows: starting
from a failure event f , which is typically a compute node soft lockup in Ranger,
we identified a large enough interval during which there are no overlapping
failures, i.e., no two successive failures occur within that time interval. This
mean time between failure (MTBF) is at least two hours on Ranger. The reason
for this is to prevent the (faulty) behaviour from a previous failure to impact
on the behaviour on the following time window.
We then split the log into 2 hour behaviours, some of which end in failures
while other are error-free. For each 2-hour behaviour, we then analysed the
behaviour in terms of T -min wide slots, i.e., we further split the behaviour into
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System failure FSystem failure F
MTBF > 2 hrs
2 hr time window
T mins
Figure 6.8: Processing and analysis of Ranger event logs.
smaller sequences, so that error detection (hence failure prediction) can be done
earlier. This is depicted in Figure 6.8. The results from the detection explain
in chapter 4, using the two different distance metrics, are shown in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Results of clustering algorithms with two different distance metrics.
From Figure 6.9, it can be observed that the hierarchical clustering algorithm
achieves better clustering results using the correlation distance metric. The f-
measure value is consistently higher than 0.7, as opposed to other clustering
algorithm and metrics combination.
Error handling time window: We define a failure prediction (hence, error
detection) to occur whenever the f-measure value exceeds 0.75. This can be
observed to occur at approximately 75 minutes within the 2 hour time window,
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i.e., the error handling time window is 45 minutes, i.e., 120− 75 = 45.
6.3.3 Identifying Anomalies Using our Methodology
From the root-cause analysis of failure on the data, we obtained 872 different
fault events from the event logs that are highly correlated with with soft lock up
failures, which are the frequently occurring failure on Ranger supercomputers.
In order to extract the set of anomalous jobs, we define a time window tw over
which resource usage data can be extracted. This time window stretches until
the occurrence of the root-cause. For every error event (root-cause), we extract
all the resource data within the time interval [Te − tw, Te], forming a resource
usage sequence. A small time window means that the “root” anomaly may be
missed, while a longer time window may mean that some “trivial” anomaly may
be identified that does not lead to failure. The time window tw used in our work
is 60 minutes, as we noticed this was the window with appropriate trade-offs.
Anomalous Jobs Extraction using PCA and ICA
The results of the anomaly detection using PCA and ICA are shown in Table 6.2.
As argued previously, we are mostly concerned with the F-measure since it cap-
tures both precision and recall. As can observed, using PCA and ICA to iden-
tify anomalous jobs for failure prediction do not result in the high F-measure
(> 0.75) needed. In fact, the F-measure values are around 10% less than the
required value. This means that (i) there is a high probability that these anoma-
lous resource usages will not lead to a system failure (ICA) and (ii) any subse-
quent propagation time is irrelevant due to the possible high proportion of false
positives (for PCA). A summary of the anomalous jobs is as shown in Table 6.5.
Table 6.2: Anomaly Detection performance of PCA and ICA.
Recall Precision Fmeasure
PCA 0.752324 0.61 0.6734
ICA 0.6432 0.73 0.684
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Change-Point Detection as Anomaly Detection
Table 6.3: Detection performance for Change Point Detection.
Recall Precision Fmeasure
CPD 0.67 0.42 0.516
To address the shortcomings in using only anomalies as failure predictors to
obtain a significant propagation time, we investigate the use of change points
in resource usage as a different type of resource usage anomalies due to sudden
surges. The results are shown in Table 6.3. As can be observed, there is a
high proportion of false positives (i.e., low precision value). This can be easily
explained by the fact that not all change-points will lead to a failure. For exam-
ple, some change points occur due to a higher workload, within the operational
profile of the application. Further, we can conclude that this method cannot be
used due to the low F-measure value.
Combining Change-points with PCA or ICA
Table 6.4: Detection performance for Change Point Detection with PCA or
ICA.
Recall Precision Fmeasure
PCA+CPD 0.7914 0.74 0.764
ICA+CPD 0.6932 0.53 0.6023
Given that PCA and ICA give good F-measure values while CPD give worse,
we seek to determine whether combining CPD with PCA or ICA gives better
result. The intuition behind this is that when a change point occurs followed
by an anomaly, this should represent a stronger predictor of failure. As can
be observed from Table 6.4, combining CPD and PCA results in a high F-
measure value of 0.764. This value is above the failure prediction threshold of
0.75. Thus, we consider that a combination of CPD and PCA will result in a
reasonable value for propagation time.
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6.3.4 Propagation Time
From the resource usage data, we extract the time at which a resource anomaly
is first seen within a sequence. As explained earlier in Section 6.2.4, the time
between when an anomalous behaviour is observed to when an error is first
logged, δTa (error lead time), is obtained.
Given that the combination of CPD and PCA gives the best failure predic-
tion with an F-Measure value greater than 0.75 (as for when using the event logs
only). The propagation time when using this combination is 3922 seconds (65
minutes). What this means is that, with a sufficiently high probability, these
anomalies will lead to failures and that the propagation time is 65 minutes.
Hence, from the perspective of error handling, the error handling time window
is extended by 65 minutes, which is considerably more than current or predicted
future checkpointing time. In comparison to the base case (using clustering),
the improvement is approximately 6545 = 140%. As an extreme, if an error is
detected within the first twenty minutes when using the event logs, then the
failure lead time is 100 minutes, giving a worst case improvement of 65100 = 65%
For reason of completeness, we provide the propagation time for the different
anomaly techniques presented in this paper in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Distribution of Anomalous Jobs and Error Propagation Time for all
the methods
aδTa (seconds)
No. of Anomalous Jobs
Detected
PCA 3011 16531
ICA 3924 15034
CPD 4022 12064
PCA+CPD 3922 15012
ICA+CPD 4227 13133
6.3.5 Other Issues
In this section, we investigate two issues concerning the methodology.
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Impact of Degree of Outlierness
The first issue is to determine whether there is a correlation between the propa-
gation time (PT) and the anomaly values of a sequence. Specifically, we wish to
determine if sequences with high values of “anomaly” have shorter propagation
time (hence, a smaller time to failure).
From the graph of Figure 6.10, it can be observed that there is no clear
pattern to support the original claim. In other words, the degree of “outlierness”
of jobs does not determine the size of the propagation time (hence, the time to
failure). This may probably depend of the type of faults and the impact of such
faults. This is an area for future work.
Distribution of Propagation Time
The second issue we consider is the distributed of propagation time across dif-
ferent failure sequences. If the distribution of propagation time is such that
certain patterns give rise to higher propagation time, then such patterns can be
identified to enable better error handling. From Figure 6.11, we observed that
for different fault sequences within each week, the propagation time seems to
be be within close region, with no much disparity. This might be attributed to
the fact that these errors leads to same failure (Soft lockup).
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we make the following specific contributions:
1. We use two anomaly-based detection techniques, namely principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) and independent component analysis (ICA) to iden-
tify anomalous resource usage in the system. We label the time when the
first resource usage anomaly occurs by Tfra.
2. We develop an approach based on change point detection to observe sudden
changes in resource usage, leading to a resource usage anomaly. We label
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the time the first sudden burst in resource usage to occur by Tfsb with
Tfsb ≤ Tfra.
3. Starting with a failure occurring at time Tf , we perform a root-cause
analysis of the failure in the system to obtain the time-stamps of the error
messages in the logs. We label the time of the first occurrence of an error
in the log by Tfem with Tfem < Tf ∧ Tfra < Tfem.
4. We apply our methodology to the resource usage logs and error logs from
the Ranger Supercomputer from TACC. Our results show that, in compar-
ison with lead failure times computed when predictions stabilized in [53],
the time window can extended by approximately 140%, with a worst-case
improvement of around 65%.
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CHAPTER 7
Summary, Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Summary
This thesis is motivated by the challenge of reducing the number of recurrent
and costly failures in distributed systems. This necessitated the use of the
system’s error logs and the resource usage/utilization data for error detection
and for enhancing system recovery. In this chapter, we summarize the key points
of each chapter, highlighting their key contributions in this thesis with further
discussions.
7.1.1 Introductory chapters
These chapters include the Introduction (Chapter 1), the survey of previous
methods (Chapter 2) and the description of the system used, the data and fault
models (Chapter 3).
The ability to detect the presence of errors that could lead to failure is an
important step in fault tolerance. It gives provision for corrective and preventive
measures to be taken and in doing this, the thesis utilises three different log data
from actual production systems.
The system data is usually huge and can be overwhelming for manual anal-
ysis. These huge logs contain events can point to the presence of faults in the
system, hence it is wise that we use this data for error detection.
We introduced a taxonomy for fault tolerance methods or approaches. This
taxonomy brings to light the categories of the approaches previously published
and our approach. Most of the previous work make use of system’s event logs to
perform detection; however, none was able to use resource usage data combined
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with event logs for detection as we did in our approach.
We have also learned that not all errors end in failure and detecting these er-
rors can be done in an unsupervised way. Furthermore, different fault categories
exist which may have different patterns.
7.1.2 Error Logs Preprocessing and Pattern Detection
As large-scale distributed systems grow in size, the size of the logs which con-
tain information about the system’s activities also increases. The huge log size
becomes a challenge since logs are the primary source of information for system
administrators. However, most of the log events are redundant, i.e., they are not
essential for performing failure analysis, therefore the log file can be compressed.
We proposed a novel, generic compression algorithm that can be instantiated
according to the structure of the log files. The approach filters these logs such
that events that serve as precursor to failure are preserved. The method did
not only compressed logs, it first extract message types in logs. The clusters
formed and indexed with ids represents message types. These message types
are useful in log analysis e.g., visualization, indexing etc [95]. Our compression
method makes use of event similarity (Levenshtein distance) and event structure
to determine a redundant event.
The efficiency of the compression technique is validated through a proposed
pattern detection algorithm.
The chapter also addressed the problem of detecting failure inducing error
patterns among message logs of large-scale computer systems. We proposed a
novel unsupervised approach that leverages the characteristics of log patterns
and the recurrent interaction between events to detect failure runs. We capture
changes in the behaviour of the sequences through change in their entropies.
The technique was verified on three different log types with positive results.
First, the results demonstrate that compression does not only reduce log size
which leads to low computational cost of failure analysis, but also enhances
detection of failure patterns. Secondly, runs that end in failure are detected
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with an average F-measure of 78%.
Future work: As a future work, we intend to develop this approach as
online detection. We hope to investigate further why this approach is affected
by temporal behaviour of faults.
7.1.3 Failure Sequence Detection Using Resource Usage
Data and Event Logs
In Chapter 5, we proposed an approach for error detection in large-scale dis-
tributed systems. The approach makes use of the novel combination of event
logs and resource usage data to improve detection accuracy. Our methodology
is based on the computation of (i) mutual information, (ii) entropy and (iii)
anomaly score of resource use to determine whether an event sequence is likely
to lead to failure, i.e., is erroneous or not. We evaluated our methodology on
the logs and resource usage data from the Ranger supercomputer and results
are shown to detect errors with a very high accuracy. We compared our ap-
proach with Nodeinfo, a well-known error detection methodology, our method
outperform Nodeinfo by up to 100%.
In the chapter, we discussed the fact that not all errors lead to failure, i.e.,
such patterns eventually recover, we call them recovery patterns. We realised
that most times these patterns are detected as failure inducing (increasing the
false positives), however, they are not. In our bid to identify such patterns, we
proposed a recovery pattern detection method based on change point detection
in large-scale distributed systems. The approach makes use of resource usage
data to detect the recovery sequence among other failure sequences. The method
leverages the fact that unusual use of resources by the systems could point
to impending failure, to detect recovery patterns. Change point detection is
employed to determine the points of anomaly within a sequence. These points
of anomalous behaviour points to a recovery or failure sequence. We proposed
a detection algorithm based on these parameters to determine if a fault will
eventually recover or end in failure. We evaluated our methodology on the
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resource usage data from the Ranger supercomputer and the results have shown
to detect recovery sequences with good accuracy. It achieved an F-measure of
64%.
7.1.4 Increasing the Error Handling Time Window in Large-
Scale Distributed Systems
In this Chapter, we have addressed the problem of increasing the error handling
or propagation time window. We have thus presented an anomaly detection-
based approach to identify anomalous use of resources in a cluster system that
points to potentially impending system failure. We have investigated three dif-
ferent anomaly detection methods, namely (i) principal component analysis, (ii)
independent component analysis and (iii) change point detection. The method
also performs root-cause analysis of failures to identify the time at which the
root-cause occurred. We then developed a case study using event logs and
resource usage data from the Ranger supercomputer. We implemented the ap-
proach from [53] for error detection to obtain a basis for comparison. We found
that the combination of CPD and PCA resulted in a high value of F-measure
of at least 0.75, resulting in an extension of the error handling time window of
140%, with a worst-case extension of 60%.
7.2 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have proposed an unsupervised error detection approach that
leverages on the features inherent in the events that describe faulty and non-
faulty patterns in log data. We further developed an approach that extends
the error handling time for which error handling techniques can be completed
before failure occurs. The huge log data produced by large-scale distributed
systems poses great challenge for any automatic analysis. A filtering approach
that reduces the size of the data by purging redundant events without losing
important ones was proposed. These approaches were applied on data from
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production systems and a high detection accuracy was achieved. In comparison
with other state-of-the-art methods, ours perform considerably better.
The proposed unsupervised approach comes with some disadvantages: Even
though a good detection accuracy was achieved, this accuracy can only be
achieved if faults always produce events symptomatic of failure; that is, faults
leading to failure must produce events in order for the method to be effective
since it is event based. In a case where a fault silently ends in failure, or behaves
similar to normal runs, then the performance of the method will be affected neg-
atively. However, the method has demonstrated its ability to perform well across
the systems used.
7.3 Future Work
The research work has shown that there is room for improvement and areas
where potential research directions could be pursued. We highlight these areas
in this chapter.
7.3.1 Improving the Error Detection
Our work demonstrates the usefulness of combining resource usage data with
event logs to perform detection. It has also opened up new directions for future
research. As a potential future work, the approach can be adapted and imple-
mented as an online detection approach. The implementation can be straight-
forward, as the event logs and resource usage data can be collected as sequences
within a certain time window as they are being logged. This can be implemented
on a live production system for testing.
As an improvement, a further investigation into the performance of this
approach on different system data and different time windows can be done;
especially, more resource usage data from other systems can be used.
We believe that the features extracted from sequences can be used to perform
a supervised learning method for error prediction. This is a promising research
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direction where the temporal relationships between events can be captured and
incorporated as features. It will enable supervised error prediction using ap-
proaches such as: Hidden Markov Model, Support Vector Machines (SVM) and
Conditional Random Fields (CRF) among many others.
7.3.2 Improving the Recovery Run Detection
One challenge with this method is that few data is available for testing. The
experiment was done on data from one production system with few recovery
patterns. A more firm assertion can be made about this technique if more data
is used from different production systems. As as future work, the behaviours of
nodes and the jobs running on each node can be studied for correlation. This
can give an insight to their behaviour and possible recovery.
7.3.3 The Error Handling Time
One of the key findings in this work is that the best way to improve the time
window for which error handling techniques like checkpointing or task migration
can be effectively applied is to be able to trigger these techniques early enough
when failure symptoms are noticed. Therefore, other methods for detecting
early fault symptoms can be implemented so that preventive error handling
methods can be applied.
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